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This paper explores the linkages between productivity and social development 
from the perspective of synthesizing the findings of projects undertaken by the Centre for 
the Study of Living Standards in three related areas. The first is a project exploring the 
linkages between productivity and social well-being involving researchers from around 
the world and culminating in the edited volume Toward a Social Understanding of 
Productivity. Contributions discuss both linkages from productivity to social well-being, 
as in the case of productivity￿s role in improving fiscal balances; and from social well-
being to productivity, as in the case of social and cultural factors surrounding the desire 
and capacity of families to invest in the education of children having powerful long-term 
consequences in a knowledge-driven economy. The second area is the Index of Economic 
Well-being developed by the Centre for the Study of Living Standards. Each of the four 
components ￿ consumption, stocks of wealth, equality and economic security ￿ are 
positively affected by productivity, and some in addition can in turn positively affect 
productivity. The third area is statistical research into the relationship between 
productivity and poverty in developing countries. It is found that this relationship is even 
stronger than that between economic growth and poverty reduction, and about as 
important as that between GDP per capita growth and poverty reduction. It is also found 
that the level of income inequality mediates the relationship between productivity growth 
and poverty reduction. The greater the level of inequality and any increase in inequality, 
the less an increase in productivity and income will reduce poverty.   6 
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  This paper explores the linkages between productivity and social development 
from the perspective of synthesizing the findings of projects undertaken by the Centre for 
the Study of Living Standards in three related areas: 
 
•  a project on the relationship between productivity and social progress which 
brought together researchers from Canada, Europe and Australia and New 
Zealand and resulted in the publication of an edited volume entitled Towards 
a Social Understanding of Productivity; 
 
•  the development of a measure of well-being called the Index of Economic  
Well-being that goes beyond GDP to incorporate aspects of well-being such  
as environmental sustainability, inequality and security and work on the 
relationship between productivity and this measure of economic well-being; and  
 
•  background studies for the International Labour Organization￿s 2004 World 
Employment Report on the linkage between productivity growth and poverty 
reduction in developing countries and on China￿s productvity performance. 
 
The volume Towards a Social Understanding of Productivity documents specific 
cases of the impact of productivity on social well-being as well as linkages running in the 
opposite direction, namely the social determinants of productivity. These links can be 
direct and immediate, such as real incomes being tightly tied to productivity trends. But 
they can also be indirect in the sense that higher real incomes do not necessarily translate 
directly into higher subjective economic security. They can also be weak. For example, 
productivity may have little or no observed effect on such important measures of social 
well-being as membership in associations and clubs. There is even the possibility that the 
relationship will be a negative one, for example when economic growth driven by 
productivity gains contributes to increased pollution. 
 
Linkages running from social well-being to productivity performance are less well 
documented but are likely to be significant. For example, the social and cultural factors 
surrounding the desire and capacity of families to invest in the education of children have 
powerful long-term consequences in a knowledge-driven economy. 
 
One specific linkage from productivity to social well-being is through the fiscal 
room to manoeuvre generated by increased productivity. Macroeconometric simulations 
of the Canadian economy to the year 2030 indicate that higher productivity growth can 
have a substantial cumulative impact on government revenues. These increased revenues 
could in turn be used to increase social well-being through expanded social spending   7 
programs. Also, these programs, as well as possible tax cuts made possible by the higher 
government revenue, could have important impacts on further improving productivity 
growth, creating a virtuous circle from higher productivity growth to improved fiscal 
balances back to increased productivity growth. 
 
The paper also discusses three examples of social well-being affecting productivity, 
namely in the cases of education, health and social diversity. It concludes that education can 
have a sizeable impact on productivity growth and economic performance. It also finds that 
the health-productivity relationship goes well beyond the obvious effect of health on 
capacity to work in terms of both energy level and working time. For instance, individuals 
with a longer life expectancy may choose to invest more in education as they receive greater 
returns from their investment. They may also be motivated to save more for retirement, 
which would lead to greater accumulation of physical capital. Finally, improvement in the 
survival and health of young children may provide incentives for reduced fertility and may 
result in increased labour-force participation. Social divergence and economic inequality are 
found to have a dampening effect on productivity through barriers to communication. 
However, this is not a sign that social homogeneity is to be preferred, as diversity can also 
have important social and economic benefits. 
 
The paper also discusses whether productivity should be a social priority and the 
linkages between social policy and productivity growth. Although productivity plays an 
important role in improving the consumption opportunities of individuals, it is not clear 
that this has translated into greater happiness, which for rich countries raises questions in 
devoting more resources to pursuing ever-faster productivity growth. 
 
In the past the relationship between the equality fostered by social policy and 
efficiency were seen as direct tradeoffs. More recent work, however, suggests that 
inequality may actually be harmful to economic growth, while many social policies promote 
growth. As a result, the policy-maker must make do without convenient intellectual 
crutches, and the implications of social programs for productivity must be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis. 
 
The Centre for the Study of Living Standards has developed the Index of Economic 
Well-being, which is based on four components of economic well-being. These 
components are flows of effective consumption, net societal accumulation of stocks of 
productive assets, poverty and inequality, and economic security from risks imposed by 
unemployment, illness, single parent poverty and poverty in old age. Productivity has a 
role in improving each of these components. In addition, independent improvements in 
some of the components can potentially improve productivity performance. 
 
Productivity increases consumption because real incomes, which are driven by 
productivity, are the primary determinant of consumption. Productivity also gives 
individuals choice in terms of taking more leisure time while maintaining their level of 
real wages. Non-working time is a part of effective consumption since individuals value 
this time at the level of the foregone after-tax wage. Increased life expectancy is also a 
part of effective consumption because individuals care about how much they consume   8 
but also about how long they can consume it ￿ and productivity can increase life 
expectancy, for example through providing higher incomes through which more 
investments in health can be made. 
 
Stocks of wealth are also affected by productivity since productivity increases 
raise national income, part of which is profits. Increased profits play a large role in 
increasing investment in physical capital as well as research and development, both of 
which contribute to stocks of productive assets. Productivity can, on the one hand, 
increase consumption of natural resources and goods that contribute to pollution, but on 
the other hand improve the efficiency with which natural resources are extracted and 
contribute to making production processes more environmentally friendly. The 
relationship between productivity and stocks of natural and environmental resources is 
hence not necessarily a negative one. 
 
Productivity￿s effect on poverty is ambiguous if a relative definition of poverty is 
used, since the relationship will depend on how aggregate productivity gains are shared 
among different income groups. However, if an absolute definition of poverty is used, 
productivity will unambiguously decrease poverty as it lifts real incomes. 
 
There no longer appears to be a belief that productivity increases unemployment 
in the long-run, and indeed, the improvement to government balances made available by 
productivity increases can be used to make unemployment insurance programs more 
generous. Improved government balances may also increase health spending, decreasing 
the out-of-pocket expenditure required by individuals in instances of illness. 
Productivity￿s effect on elderly and single parent poverty is the same as that for the 
overall population. 
 
Virtuous circles are also evident for some components of the Index of Economic 
Well-being and productivity. For example, investments in the stock of research and 
development play a large role in increasing productivity, which in turn can cause further 
investment, leading in turn back to higher productivity. Increased leisure time, a part of 
the consumption component of the Index, increases productivity measured on an hours 
basis since for a given level of output workers work more intensely for a shorter amount 
of time. 
 
The work on productivity and social development discussed thus far applies 
mainly to developed countries. Much previous literature has investigated the statistical 
relationships between poverty and economic growth/GDP per capita growth for 
developing countries, but very little work has been done on the relationship between 
productivity growth and poverty in developing countries. The Centre for the Study of 
Living Standards explored this relationship in detail in background papers for the 
International Labour Organization. 
 
First of all, it was found that productivity growth accounts for a large share of 
economic growth across all developing countries with a smaller role for population 
growth and growth in the employment to total population ratio. This, however, was not   9 
the case for Africa, where population growth had the largest impact. In the case of GDP 
per capita, output per worker growth was much more important than growth in the 
employment to total population ratio in all developing countries. 
 
Given the importance of productivity in output and GDP per capita, the 
relationship between productivity and poverty, defined as the proportion of the 
population with less than $1US per day or $2US per day, is expected to be as important 
as the relationships between poverty and these same variables. Indeed, regressions of the 
change in poverty over the 1970-1998 period on growth in output per worker over this 
period show a better fit than when economic growth is the independent variable, and a 
comparable fit to regressions with GDP per capita growth as the independent variable. 
Similar conclusions hold for both the one dollar per day poverty rate and the two dollar 
per day rate, and across different developing regions. 
 
  Regression analysis was also undertaken for the level of poverty in 1998 on the 
level of output per worker in 1998. A strong negative effect was again found, similar in 
magnitude and fit to that between the level of poverty and the level of GDP per capita. 
This conclusion holds for elasticities as well, and when alternative measures of poverty 
such as the Human Poverty Indicator are considered. Overall, the evidence suggests that 
productivity￿s potential for decreasing poverty in developing countries has not been 
adequately recognized. Focus in previous research has been on GDP per capita, which 
indeed is driven by productivity. 
 
It was also found through multivariate regression analysis of changes in poverty 
on income inequality and productivity growth that the level of income inequality 
mediates the relationship between productivity growth and poverty reduction. The greater 
the level of inequality and any increase in inequality, the less an increase in productivity 
and income will reduce poverty. 
 
These results provide strong support for the view that productivity growth is 
essential for poverty reduction and should be a priority for developing countries. 
Consequently, the challenge developing countries face is to foster productivity growth, 
but at the same time to develop adjustment mechanisms that can protect those negatively 
affected by such productivity growth. It is important that productivity growth be seen by 
the population as the basis of the material advance of society and not associated with 
permanent job loss and catastrophic falls in income and living conditions. This is an issue 
of political economy. 
 
In the end, the research undertaken by the Centre for the Study of Living Standards 
exploring the linkages between social development and productivity calls for a social 
understanding of productivity. Productivity does not simply enhance our material 
standard of living; it also expands the range of choices available. Increased productivity 
gives society the choice through both markets and the political arena of whether our 
greater economic well-being will manifest itself through greater private consumption 
goods, more public goods, additional leisure, or greater public transfers to increase 
equality and economic security.    10 
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A key focus of the research agenda of the Centre for the Study of Living 
Standards (CSLS)
2 has recently been the linkages between productivity and social 
development in market economies, with particular but not exclusive reference to OECD 
countries. The CSLS has undertaken three major projects in this area: 
 
•  a project on the relationship between productivity and social progress which 
brought towards researchers from Canada, Europe and Australia and New 
Zealand and resulted in the publication of an edited volume entitled Towards 
a Social Understanding of Productivity (Sharpe, Banting, and St-Hilaire, 
2002); 
 
•  the development of a measure of well-being called the Index of Economic 
Well-being that goes beyond GDP to incorporate aspects of well-being such 
as environmental sustainability, inequality and security (Osberg and Sharpe, 
2002a) and work on the relationship between productivity and this measure of 
economic well-being (Sharpe, 2002); and  
 
•  background studies for the International Labour Organization￿s 2004 World 
Employment Report on the linkage between productivity growth and poverty 
                                                            
1 This paper was presented at the Symposium on Social Dimensions of Productivity organized by the Asian 
Productivity Organization, December 16-18, 2003, India International Centre, Lodhi Estate, New Delhi, 
India.  Parts of the paper draw on Banting, Sharpe and St-Hilaire (2002), Osberg and Sharpe (2002b) and 
CSLS (2003a).  The author would like to thank Lynne Browne and Jeremy Smith for editorial assistance. 
2 The CSLS is a national, independent, not-for-profit research organization established in 1995 based in 
Ottawa, Canada. The two main objectives of CSLS are to:  
•  contribute to a better understanding of trends and determinants of productivity, living standards 
and economic well-being through research;  
•  contribute to public debate by developing and advocating specific policies to improve 
productivity, living standards, and economic well-being.  
The research activities of CSLS are motivated by the following general principles:  
•  in the long run, productivity growth is the key to improved living standards;  
•  in the short to medium term elimination of any output gap is the most effective way to raise living 
standards;  
•  the equitable sharing of productivity gains among all groups in society is an essential element of 
the economic growth process;  
•  increased cooperation among the various groups which make up our society can contribute 
significantly to better living standards; and  
•  reliable data are crucial to the monitoring and analysis of living standards and to the development 
of effective policies to increase living standards.  
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reduction in developing countries (CSLS, 2003a) and on China￿s productvity 
performance (CSLS, 2003b). 
 
The objective of this paper is to explore the linkages between productivity and 
social development by presenting a synthesis of these three CSLS research projects. The 
paper highlights the relevance of the findings for developing countries in the context of 
this symposium on the social dimensions of productivity. 
 
The paper is divided into three main sections. The first section provides a 
synthesis of the main findings of the CSLS volume Towards a Social Understanding of 
Productivity (Sharpe, Banting, and St-Hilaire, 2002). The theme of the volume is the two-
way relationship between productivity and social progress or development. Productivity 
growth provides the basis for improvements in social conditions, while better social 
conditions in turn feedback to high productivity. This section first discusses the impact of 
productivity on social well-being by looking at how productivity affects government 
balances and environmental sustainability, then explores the social determinants of 
productivity growth with particular reference to education, health, and social divergence, 
and finally examines the linkages between social policy and productivity. 
 
The second section of the paper briefly presents the Index of Economic Well-
being and then discusses the two-way relationship between the four components of the 
Index (consumption flows, stocks of wealth, income inequality, and economic security) 
and productivity.  
 
The third section highlights the key findings of the CSLS study for the ILO￿s 
World Employment Report on the linkage between productivity growth and poverty 
reduction in developing countries. This section first presents data on the contribution of 
productivity growth to economic growth and to growth in GDP per capita in developing 
countries. It then explores the empirical relationship between productivity, poverty and 
inequality, looking at the relationship between productivity and poverty using simple 
regression analysis, as well as the relationship between productivity, poverty, and income 
distribution using multivariate regression analysis. It finally examines the relationship 
between productivity and poverty using alternative measures of poverty. 
 
Productivity is the relationship between the output of goods and services and the 
 inputs of resources, human and non-human used in the production process, with the 
 relationship usually expressed in ratio form. Both outputs and inputs are measured in 
physical volumes and thus are unaffected by price changes. Multiplying quantities of the 
various outputs and inputs by the price each has commanded in a base year yields the 
comparable or constant price values that can be added up to provide measures of 
aggregate output and input. The ratios may relate to the national economy, to an 
industry, or to a firm or even to a plant. Output growth that exceeds growth in measured 
inputs, that is to say an increase in the ratio of output to inputs, is what analysts mean 
when they say productivity is increasing. 
 
Productivity growth is the most important source of long-term economic growth.   12 
For example, from 1946 to 2000 real GDP per hour growth￿ the productivity of labour￿ 
accounted for 65 per cent of real GDP output growth in the business sector in Canada. 
Indeed, over the long term increased productivity is the only way to increase the standard 
of living, defined as real GDP per capita. Per capita income growth can come from 
increases in the employment-total population ratio, reflecting increased labour force 
participation, lower unemployment or a larger share of population of working age, or 
from improved terms of trade. But these sources of income growth are unsustainable in 
the long run as they have upper bounds (except possibly for the terms of trade). 
Productivity growth, on the other hand, is not constrained by the size of the population or 
other factors and its growth is at least in principle sustainable through technological 
advance.  
 
Thus, trends in productivity are the key determinant of long-run trends in both 
absolute and relative living standards. The fall-off in real income growth in many 
developed economies since 1973 is a direct result of slower productivity growth. Slower 
increases in the amount of output each worker produces means that there is slower 
growth in the output or income that can be shared among the total population.  
 
The magnitude of the productivity growth estimates economists debate ￿ almost 
always below three percent for the aggregate economy in developed countries (but much 
greater in high-growth developing countries such as China) ￿ may seem small or even 
trivial to non-economists. But small differences matter and the implications for society 
between a 1 and 3 per cent trend productivity growth rate are huge. Based on the 
mathematical rule of 72, a one per cent productivity growth scenario means that it will 
take 72 years or three generations for real output and hence income per worker to double. 
In contrast, under a 3 per cent productivity scenario it would take only 24 years or one 
generation for real income to double, while the 6.6 per cent average annual productivity 
growth rate experienced in China over the 1978-2001 period (CSLS, 2003b:Table 1.1) 
means living standards double in the space of only 11 years. Even moving from a 1 to 2 
per cent trend productivity growth world cuts in half (to 36 years) the time needed to 
double living standards.  
 
There is of course much more to life than productivity and the real income growth 
it generates, as even economists realize. The economic well-being and quality of life of 
the population, much broader concepts than GDP per capita, are determined by many 
factors, of which productivity is only one. A focus on productivity by no means implies 
that economists consider these other determinants of well-being and quality of life 
unimportant. Economists study productivity because it is crucial for real income growth 
and important for improving economic well-being and quality of life, or at least its 
material aspects. They also believe that a better understanding of productivity trends and 
determinants can lead to the development of public policies and private sector actions 
that can improve productivity performance.  
 
  An understanding of the debate on the productivity-social development nexus 
requires familiarity with certain basic productivity concepts, including the differences   13 
between measures of partial and total factor productivity, and the differences between 
productivity levels and growth rates.
3 
 
In productivity analysis, a fundamental distinction is made between partial and 
total productivity measures. The former relate output to only one input, more often labour 
and capital, although intermediate goods or raw materials also regularly figure in some 
compilation of inputs, even though it is recognized that other inputs contributed to output. 
The latter relate output to a combination of inputs, such as capital and labour. These 
measures are known as total factor or multifactor productivity and represent the growth in 
output not accounted for by input growth.  
 
  The most readily available and widely used measure of productivity is labour 
productivity, the ratio of output to some measure of labour input (employment or hours). 
This term sometimes creates confusion as it may seem to imply that the level of labour 
productivity or the rate of growth of labour productivity is attributable solely to the 
effects of labour. In fact, labour productivity reflects the influence of all factors that 
affect productivity, including capital accumulation, technical change, and the 
organization of production. While the intensity of labour effort is obviously a factor that 
does affect labour productivity, it is generally significantly less important than the 
amount of capital a worker has to work with or the level of production technology. 
 
 
                                                          
The concept of total or multifactor productivity has been developed to measure 
the contribution of all factors of production to productivity growth. The rates of growth 
of all inputs are weighted to give one growth rate for the combined inputs.
4 Total factor 
productivity growth is defined as the growth rate of output minus the growth rate of the 
combined inputs (just as labour productivity growth equals output growth minus labour 
input growth).   As the growth rate of the capital stock is generally greater than that of 
employment (and hence the capital/labour ratio is rising), the growth rate of total factor 
productivity (using labour and capital as inputs) is generally less than the growth rate of 
labour productivity. This situation arises from the fact that the growth rate of the 
combined inputs of capital and labour exceeds that of labour alone. 
 
The meaning of total factor productivity is also controversial. Some economists 
interpret it as a measure of overall technical change, others as a measure of disembodied 
technological change, that is technical change that is not embodied in new machinery and 




3 Two less crucial issues are the differences between output per worker and output per hour and the impact 
of the business cycle on productivity. For discussion of these issues, see Sharpe, 2002. 
4 A key issue in total factor productivity measurement is the weighting of these inputs. Under competitive 
conditions, the current dollar income share of the factor of production ￿ labour income for hours worked 
and interest plus gross capital income (profits, and depreciation) for the capital stock ￿ is normally 
considered the relative contribution of the factor to output and consequently used to weight the factor to 
produce an index of total input, or the growth rate of the index. When markets are not competitive, as in the 
case of monopolies, the weighting issue is much more complex. 
   14 
  It is incorrect to say that total factor productivity is a superior or preferred  
 measure of productivity compared to labour productivity as the two concepts serve 
 different purposes. For those interested in how efficiently all factors of production are 
 used in the production process, total factor productivity is the relevant productivity 
 measure since it takes account of the productivity of factors of production other than 
 labour, such as capital, intermediate goods, and energy. For those interested in the 
 potential of the economy to raise the standard of living, labour productivity is the 
   relevant productivity measure. It tells us how much output or income is produced by 
each worker and when combined with the total number of workers, how much total 
income there is to be distributed among the population. 
  
A second important distinction is that between productivity levels and growth 
rates. The former refers to the output per unit of input at a given point in time. For 
example, in 2000 the level or value of output per hour in the business sector in Canada 
was $29.14, expressed in constant 1992 prices. The latter represents the percentage 
change in output per hour levels, expressed in constant prices, between two points in 
time. An example would be the 13.6 per cent increase in labour productivity between 
1989 and 2000, when the level of output per hour was $25.65. One often hears the 
complaint that Canada￿s productivity is poor. This could be referring to a situation of a 
low aggregate productivity level or a low productivity growth rate, or both. It is important 
that commentators specify whether they are referring to levels or growth rates as the 
implications of the two situations can differ significantly.  
 
International comparison of productivity levels requires that levels expressed in a 
domestic currency be converted into a common currency. This conversion can be done 
with either market exchange rates or exchange rates based on purchasing power parities 
(PPPs), that is the exchange rate that equalizes the price of a basket of goods and services 
between two countries. For accurate productivity level comparisons, it is imperative that 
PPPs be used, although the development of reliable PPPs is a complex task, particularly 
at the industry level. The existence of a range of PPPs produced by different agencies and 




II  Productivity and Social Development 
 
 
In contrast with the relative clarity of the meaning of productivity provided in the 
introduction, ￿social development￿ is a much broader idea. It can be manifested by 
improvements in a wide range of measures, including the incomes of families and 
individuals, the sense of economic security enjoyed by workers, the levels of poverty and 
social exclusion, the extent of inequality in life chances, the vibrancy of our distinctive 
communities, the strength of social cohesion and the sustainability of our environmental 
heritage. Such a complex and multifaceted phenomenon is thus best thought of as an 
overarching societal goal rather than as an analytical concept. 
   15 
  Any assessment of social development is also complex because it must move 
beyond aggregate measures. Overall indicators of the average level of social well-being 
always mask important variations in the experiences of different individuals and groups. 
Economic and social change on a major scale always produces winners and losers, groups 
who benefit from the new order and others whose economic and social prospects are 
eroded by the same forces. The history of wars, it is often observed, is written by the 
winning side. The history of social progress needs to be more balanced. 
  
As well as being complex, social development is inevitably a contested idea, 
because different people have very different conceptions of what constitutes the ￿good￿ 
society. Even if members of society agree on whether specific indicators tap dimensions 
of social development, they will differ on the relative importance to be attached to the 
various indicators and hence on whether social development, in the aggregate, is 
advancing or declining.
5 In the end, therefore, there can be no single measure of social 
development. Exploring the relationships between productivity and social development 
remains a compelling task, but the judgements rendered in this paper best seen as 
contributions to an open and pluralistic debate on the topic. 
 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the linkages between productivity and social 
development are many and varied. In some cases the links are direct and immediate; 
changes in average incomes are tightly tied to productivity trends. In other cases the links 
are much more indirect and conditioned by other factors. For example, there may be a 
significant lag between productivity improvement and increased incomes on the one 
hand, and one￿s own sense of economic security, as measured by opinion polls, on the 
other. In yet other areas, the link between changes in productivity and important 
dimensions of social well-being may be especially weak. For example, productivity may 
have little impact on indicators of social capital such as membership in associations and 
groups; cultural or social factors are probably much more decisive in shaping this aspect 
of our collective experience. Finally, in some cases the link between productivity and 
social development may be negative. For example, the economic growth made possible 
by productivity gains may have a negative effect on certain environmental indicators such 
as greenhouse gas emissions, or on quality-of-life indicators such as time spent 
commuting. 
 
It is also important to note that the relationship between productivity and social 
development may not be constant over time. For example, the impact of higher aggregate 
real incomes arising from productivity growth on the rate of poverty may be strong in 
certain periods and weak in others, because of changes in the nature of growth or the 
influence of other factors on poverty. 
 
                                                            
5 For certain indicators, there may even be disagreement about which direction of change represents social 
development, reflecting the ideological or world view of the observer. For example, some may see a rising 
proportion of students in private schools as a negative indicator because they believe such a trend threatens 
the development of an inclusive society. Others may see such a trend as positive since it means individuals 
have more choice in the educational options for their children.   16 
The importance of the indirect linkages between productivity and the social lives 
of citizens is evident in their implications for public policy. In part, the impact of 
productivity on social well-being flows through public policy. To take the most obvious 
example, the post-1973 productivity slowdown that took place in all OECD countries 
reduced government revenues and increased deficits, and the growth of social programs 
in OECD countries, including Canada, was much less rapid after 1973. Of course, 
governments did have options, and fundamentally political judgements inevitably had to 
be made about how to proceed. But the erosion of the fiscal dividend enjoyed during 
capitalism￿s golden era from 1945 to 1973 because of slower productivity growth left 
governments with fewer fiscal resources and hence less room to manoeuvre. Thus 
productivity performance is a powerful factor influencing public policies, even if its 
impact is indirect and mediated by political and social pressures. 
 
Finally, in comparison with the links running from productivity to social 
development, those running from social development or social well-being to productivity 
performance are less obvious and less well documented. Nevertheless, these links are 
likely to be significant. To take the most obvious example, in a knowledge-based 
economy, social and cultural factors that influence the desire and capacity of families to 
invest in their children￿s education and development have potentially powerful long-term 
consequences for productivity growth. Changes in family structures and other social 
patterns that influence the capacity of families and communities to make such 
investments matter. For these and other reasons, some analysts have argued that social 
inequality can have negative implications for the accumulation of human capital, and that 
greater equality can boost long-term productivity growth. Similarly, many analysts have 
argued that the strength of social networks and the levels of social and political trust 
represent a form of social capital with important implications for economic activity. 
 
The links between productivity and social development are thus multiple and 
complex, and tracking the relationships in a comprehensive manner is a challenging 
analytical task. Nevertheless, as the rest of this section shows, it is possible to make at 
least provisional judgements about the core dynamics at work.  
 
 
The Impact of Productivity on Social Well-being: The Cases of Government Balances 
and Environmental Sustainability 
 
  In examining the linkages between productivity and social development, one of 
the first considerations is the potential impact of changes in productivity growth on 
government fiscal balances, which in turn affects the government￿s ability to contribute 
to social development. Of course, larger fiscal balances do not necessarily translate into 
enhanced social measures, as governments may have other competing objectives. But, 
clearly, determining the sensitivity of fiscal balances to alternative productivity growth 
rates is an initial step in determining how productivity growth can affect the ability of 
governments to pursue social objectives. 
 
Peter Dungan (2002) investigated the sensitivity of Canadian government fiscal 
balances to alternative long-run productivity growth rates using a macroeconometric   17 
model to conduct simulations to the year 2030. Overall, the simulations indicate that even 
relatively small changes in productivity growth rates can cumulate over several decades 
to produce large changes in GDP and living standards, and this can alter significantly the 
fiscal ￿room to manoeuvre￿ of the federal and provincial governments and of public 
pension plans. This is true whether we are contemplating higher or lower productivity 
growth rates. For instance, a relatively modest addition of 0.3 per cent to annual 
productivity growth from 2004 to 2030 increases real GDP by 8 percent, or $171 billion 
Canadian ($2000), over the base-case scenario by the end of the period. This translates 
into an increase of $71 billion in aggregate government revenues. How the fiscal room to 
manoeuvre is used could have important effects on productivity growth itself: some tax 
cuts or expenditure increases could in turn raise productivity growth, through either 
improved technology or capital accumulation, while some poorly designed new social 
programs could reduce incentives and lower productivity growth. This feedback from 
fiscal policy to productivity becomes more important the further we go into the future.  
 
As manifested by the intense debate throughout the world on the ratification of 
the Kyoto Accord, the issue of sustainability of natural capital and its implications for 
economic growth ranks high in the interests of both policy-makers and the general public. 
Nancy Olewiler (2002) has explored the crucial, but often ignored, linkages among 
natural capital, sustainability and productivity. 
 
Olewiler defines sustainability as the ability of the economy to maintain the flow 
of production necessary to prevent a decline in per-capita consumption indefinitely, so 
that future generations can have a standard of living equal to or better than that of the 
present generation. In looking at natural capital as an input into production, Olewiler 
draws a clear distinction between those forms of natural capital, such as water and our 
atmosphere, that are essential to human existence, and other resources for which there are 
substitutes. This distinction between essential and non-essential inputs in turn leads to the 
concepts of weak and strong sustainability. Weak sustainability assumes that all the 
forms of capital involved are perfectly substitutable for each other, and that sustainability 
requires only that an aggregate stock of capital be maintained at a level necessary to 
ensure indefinite production. Strong sustainability on the other hand recognizes that 
specific forms of natural capital are essential ￿ that is, they have no substitutes ￿ and 
that stocks of these resources must be kept intact to ensure continued production. The 
challenge is to determine what forms of natural capital are essential and how to sustain 
the necessary stocks. 
  
Olewiler examines productivity in natural resource industries in Canada and the 
United States to determine whether depletion in natural resource capital has affected 
productivity growth. Based on her detailed analysis of labour and total factor productivity 
growth rates, the author observes that: 
 
•  For Canadian non-renewable resource industries, changes in the stock of 
natural capital have not led to a sustained decrease in labour or total factor 
productivity. Indeed technological change, whether induced by environmental   18 
regulation or stock depletion, appears to be contributing to continued 
productivity growth in these industries. 
•  For Canadian renewable resource industries, such as logging and fishing, 
productivity has been declining due to poor resource-management practices. 
While these industries are certainly not essential for the overall sustainability 
of production in the Canadian economy, their loss does affect the viability of 
many communities. 
 
•  Ignorance of the state of our environmental capital and its relationship to 
productivity and sustainability is particularly apparent in our lack of 
knowledge about threshold effects. Once a threshold is exceeded, damage to 
production and productivity from environmental degradation may be severe 
and irreversible. This uncertainty regarding thresholds has led many 
researchers to advocate a precautionary approach to environmental policy. 
 
Olewiler concludes that the development of reliable productivity estimates for 
natural capital sectors is important for monitoring trends in sustainability. Reductions in 
productivity may be seen as a warning that production and consumption are moving into 
a path of non-sustainability. Falling productivity in sectors that rely on natural capital 
may signal three possibilities: (1) technological change is not keeping up with depletion, 
(2) substitute inputs are not readily available, or (3) regulation is not addressing, in an 
appropriate manner, the market failures associated with the use of particular resources. 
 
 
Social Determinants of Productivity: Education, Health, and Social Divergence 
 
Most research on the drivers of productivity growth has focused on economic 
factors, such as investment, new technology and innovation, market structures and 
openness to trade. But economic variables alone do not fully explain differences in the 
levels of productivity and economic growth of countries around the world. This is 
especially the case when attention is focused on the growth experience of countries at all 
levels of development, from the richest to the poorest. The differences in productivity 
from the most to the least developed countries are enormous, and coherent explanations 
must go beyond standard economic variables to incorporate a wider range of institutional 
and social factors. When attention narrows to the experience of industrial or OECD 
countries, economic factors do a better job of explaining differences in their productivity. 
Nevertheless, even here a significant portion of productivity growth is unexplained by 
models built on purely economic factors, leaving open the question of the role of the 
institutional and social characteristics of different countries. 
 
1) Impact of Education 
 
The increased focus and attention of researchers and policy-makers, in recent 
years, on the potential determinants of productivity growth has generated considerable 
interest in human capital as a key contributing factor. Skills, innovation and human 
capital feature prominently on the policy agenda of industrialized countries concerned   19 
with productivity and competitiveness issues. Not surprisingly, formal education is the 
preferred and most conventional policy instrument of governments in pursuing these 
objectives. Indeed, ￿more is better￿ is often the guiding principle here. The actual 
linkages, however, are not as straightforward as they may appear. Indeed, there are gains 
to be achieved through a better understanding of the relationship between the skills 
developed through formal education and their causal impact on productivity, as well as a 
more nuanced approach to policy in this area.  
 
Arthur Sweetman (2002) has pointed out that ￿the issue is not whether education 
has benefits but, rather, the magnitude of its ￿true￿ benefits, the benefits relative to costs, 
and the distribution of costs and benefits.￿ Sweetman notes the mixed macroeconomic 
evidence on the central role of human capital for economic growth, and concludes that 
the problem is basically one of measurement. The studies that failed to find a correlation 
tended to use educational attainment, enrolment rates or educational spending as 
measures of a country￿s human capital. More recent studies that use direct measures of 
actual labour-force skills based on the quality of education (e.g., standardized test results 
or literacy scores) have found a ￿substantial, and remarkably precise, correlation between 
human capital and growth.￿ Based on his detailed review of endogenous growth 
literature, Sweetman concludes that both the quality and content of education have a 
sizeable impact on overall productivity and economic growth. He cites as an example the 
results of a study by Robert Barro of Harvard University, which suggest that an 
additional year of education of ￿average￿ quality is associated with an annual increase of 
0.44 per cent in GDP. This implies a real social rate of return on education of about 7 
percent.  
 
2) Impact of Health 
 
While human capital is commonly associated with education and skills, health 
also has potential links to productivity. Emile Tompa (2002) finds that the health-
productivity relationship goes well beyond the obvious effect of health on capacity to 
work in terms of both energy level and working time. The author describes three 
additional pathways through which health can affect productivity at an aggregate level. 
For instance, individuals with a longer life expectancy may choose to invest more in 
education as they receive greater returns from their investment. They may also be 
motivated to save more for retirement, which would lead to greater accumulation of 
physical capital. Finally, improvement in the survival and health of young children may 
provide incentives for reduced fertility and may result in increased labour-force 
participation. 
 
Tompa￿s review of historical economic trends reveals ￿substantive evidence 
concerning the productivity impact of increased life expectancy and reduced morbidity 
over the last few centuries in Europe and the United States.￿ He cites estimates indicating 
that substantial improvements in health and nutrition explain as much as 30 percent of 
growth in per-capita income in the United Kingdom since 1790. Similar estimates of the 
impacts of health are also found in cross-country studies based on data for the last 50 
years, which would suggest that these historical trends have not fully run their course.   20 
 
Tompa reports results from a range of studies indicating that between 21 and 47 
percent of GDP growth per worker over the last 25 to 30 years can be linked to 
improvements in the health of populations. As Tompa points out, however, most of the 
research in this area has focused on life expectancy as a measure of health, which, given 
significant convergence among developed countries, has become a less salient indicator 
in explaining productivity differences among these countries. In his view this clearly 
underscores the need for more refined and relevant indicators (e.g., morbidity, vitality, 
mental health and acuity) if we are to fully comprehend the contemporary role of health 
as a productivity driver in developed economies. 
 
Given the multifaceted nature of the factors that influence health and, by 
extension, productivity, a more holistic approach to population health, including 
initiatives in areas traditionally considered outside the purview of health policy, may 
prove useful. A review of the health-productivity relationship from a human-capital 
perspective suggests that education policy, child-care and family policy, and labour-
market policy are all important avenues through which the public sector can have an 
impact on population health. 
 
3) Impact of Social Divergence 
 
Quentin Grafton, Stephen Knowles and Dorian Owen (2002) have examined the 
implications for productivity arising from the level of social diversity along a variety of 
dimensions, including ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences and inequalities 
between rich and poor. Their basic intuition is that human beings tend to associate and 
communicate most readily with people similar to themselves, and their hypothesis is 
therefore that ￿social divergence￿ generates social barriers to communication among 
groups, inhibiting the diffusion of knowledge and lowering the level of productivity in 
the economy. As a consequence, the more diverse the society and the greater the number 
of distinct social groups, the higher the communication costs and the greater the barriers 
to the exchange of ideas and innovation. 
 
Grafton et al. compare their concept of social distance to related concepts such as 
social capital, trust and social networks. They note that the impact of the polarization of 
societies along ethnic lines has received considerable attention in the literature on 
economic development. A variety of analysts have concluded that ethnic diversity tends 
to generate high levels of rent-seeking among competing ethnic groups, at the expense of 
general economic policies that promote growth. Ethnolinguistic and religious diversity is 
also a predictor of conflict, political instability and weak institutional frameworks, all of 
which can retard growth. Similar findings emerge in terms of income inequality and 
inequality in levels of educational attainment. 
 
 Grafton et al. analyze the impact on total factor productivity of a set of measures 
of social divergence, using data from a cross-section of 31 developing countries. Their 
findings also support the proposition that social diversity and economic inequality 
weaken economic performance. These research findings are clearly preliminary, and are   21 
subject to important limitations. For example, indicators of social divergence do not 
directly measure the extent and quality of communication among individuals and across 
social groups in a society. More direct measures of the links and exchanges among 
individuals would allow a clearer test of the proposition that social diversity inhibits the 
diffusion of knowledge and innovation. In addition, most of the literature on the 
economic consequences of social fragmentation uses data sets that are dominated by the 
experience of developing countries, and the authors￿ own analysis is limited to 
developing nations. The applicability of such findings to high-income countries that are 
socially diverse, including Canada, is an open question. Such countries tend to have much 
stronger institutional frameworks and richer communications networks that may well 
reduce the barriers to exchange across groups. 
 
Finally, Grafton and his colleagues stress that their analysis does not imply that 
social homogeneity is to be preferred. Social diversity can also have important economic 
benefits, as suggested by J.S. Mill in a passage quoted by the authors: ￿It is hardly 
possible to overrate the value￿of placing human beings in contact with persons 
dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action unlike those with which 
they are familiar.￿ The danger, the authors argue, is that barriers to communication across 
groups can prevent the benefits of diversity from being realized. The challenge for 
multicultural countries is therefore to develop institutions and policies that facilitate 
communication among groups.  
 
Social factors such as educational levels, health care and social diversity may not 
be standard features of the debate about the determinants of productivity growth. But the 
papers highlighted above illustrate the importance of understanding the potential linkages 




Should Productivity be a Social Priority? 
 
Although the debate over productivity turns in part on empirical evidence of the 
relationships at work, it also touches on fundamental normative questions about values, 
the nature of the good society and the purposes of public action. In the most general 
sense, it is difficult to challenge a commitment to productivity or efficiency, understood 
as the best possible use of scarce resources to achieve a valued end. Who could be 
opposed to achieving greater human welfare ￿ to meeting our economic, social and 
psychological needs more fully ￿ with the resources at our disposal? In most policy 
debates, however, the concept of productivity tends to take on a narrow economic focus, 
one concerned with maximizing economic output. The social priority of this conception 
of productivity is certainly open to challenge, both in theory and in active politics, and 
the challenge emerges strongly in the work of Joseph Heath. 
 
  Heath (2002) argues that the citizens of developed countries tend to overestimate 
the contribution that further productivity growth will make to their welfare. Traditionally, 
productivity growth was thought to contribute to increased leisure time, greater consumer 
satisfaction, the elimination of poverty and greater public support for redistributive   22 
efforts to narrow social inequality. While accepting that such benefits have flowed in the 
past, Heath argues that in the last 25 years productivity growth has contributed less and 
less to the well-being of Canadians. He points to the following indicators: 
 
•  After a long period of growth in leisure time, average working hours per week 
have begun to edge up again in North America over the last two decades. 
Moreover, a dramatic increase in two-income families ￿ reflecting in part the 
widespread perception that it is impossible to maintain a middle-class lifestyle 
on the basis of one salary ￿ has made the juggling of work and family 
increasingly difficult for many Canadians. 
 
•  While productivity growth has led to higher consumption, there is no evidence 
that it has produced greater overall consumer satisfaction or happiness. Heath 
draws on a number of surveys that show that whereas economic growth is 
strongly associated with increased happiness in poor countries, there is no 
correlation between higher consumption and increased happiness in richer 
countries. Certainly, there is little evidence that people in rich countries have 
become happier in the last 25 years. 
 
•  Economic growth alone no longer seems to be reducing poverty. Important 
gains were made in the post-war decades as a result of the expansion of 
redistributive government programs, but Heath points to studies finding no 
reduction in the level of ￿basic needs￿ poverty since the late 1970s. 
 
•  Economic growth during the last 25 years has not increased people￿s 
willingness to share through redistributive programs. Heath argues that there 
seems to be growing middle-class resistance to redistribution and the taxation 
needed to support it. 
 
The key puzzle for Heath is why further economic growth does not lead to greater 
happiness in developed countries. In attempting to solve this puzzle, he canvasses three 
currents of thought in the literature. One possible explanation is that increased 
consumption does not generate lasting increments in welfare, because the process of 
satisfying our desires generates new desires, an interpretation that Heath traces from 
classical Greek philosophers to modern analysts such as John Kenneth Galbraith. A 
second explanation, which Heath describes as neo-Veblenian, contends that consumption 
not only satisfies needs but also communicates status, class, upbringing and tastes. The 
difficulty with this element of consumption is that such status hierarchies have a zero-
sum structure. If a spurt of economic growth suddenly allowed everyone to purchase an 
exotic car, the process would cancel out the status inherent in driving one. A third 
possible explanation draws on the work of Fred Hirsch, who argues that the supply of 
some goods, which he labels positional goods, is fixed. Waterfront property is a classic 
example. For these goods, the process of economic growth does not increase their 
quantity; it increases only their relative prices. As people become richer, therefore, some 
goods may become easier to acquire but positional goods continue to recede over the 
horizon.   23 
 
Heath argues that if these three forms of consumption absorb a significant portion 
of the benefits of economic growth, there will be little increase in satisfaction, at either 
the individual or the aggregate level. For Heath, this argues against making productivity 
growth a social priority in developed countries. For this reason, he is sceptical about 
investing scarce public dollars in a productivity agenda, and believes that other forms of 
investment will be more effective in enhancing the welfare of Canadians. He suggests a 
number of possibilities, including dealing seriously with the externalities generated by 
economic growth for the environment, reducing crowding in urban areas, increasing the 
supply of public goods, promoting leisure and increasing individuals￿ sense of security. 
However, his key point is that since productivity growth does not generate the benefits 
we expect, it should not be treated as an unchallenged priority, and we should not worry 
about our relative productivity compared to other countries, such as the United States. 
There is no reason why a decline in our relative ￿standard of living￿ should necessarily 
mean a decline in our quality of life. 
 
In response to Heath￿s critique of a productivity agenda, two points should be 
stressed. First, the relevance of his critique does not apply to developing countries. Many 
studies show that for poor countries, higher GDP per capita does indeed raise the overall 
subjective well-being or happiness of the population (Easterlin, 1996). It also provides 
obvious material benefits for the population, including better health care and education 
opportunities. Second, Heath fails to note than many of the objectives he prefers over 
productivity growth, such as greater public services and more leisure time, can be 
obtained through productivity growth. Indeed, productivity growth is a means to an end, 
not an end in itself. It provides society with choices. Productivity gains can be taken in 
the form of greater private consumption, more public services, or reduced working time. 
It goes without saying that these productivity gains must not be achieved at any cost and 




Social Policy and Productivity 
 
The question of whether productivity is a social priority raises the related question 
of whether there is an implicit tradeoff between economic growth and social well-being. 
Establishing the relative priority of different goals is especially important if the tradeoffs 
are harsh, if more of one requires deep sacrifices of another valued goal. But is this the 
situation we face? Is there a sharp tradeoff between productivity growth and social policy 
objectives? Or could there actually be a positive relationship between these two agendas?  
 
The traditional view is that there is an inherent conflict between economic 
efficiency and social equality, a view neatly summarized in the title of Okun￿s famous 
book, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff (1975). This view gained renewed 
currency in the policy debates of the 1990s, as commentators contrasted the economic 
performance of Europe and the United States in that decade. The European record was 
one of slow economic growth, particularly of employment, a pattern many commentators 
dubbed ￿Eurosclerosis￿ and blamed on the welfare state. In contrast, the United States   24 
was recording a major surge in employment and strong productivity growth, which was 
widely heralded as the advent of a new economy ￿ indeed a third industrial revolution 
￿ rooted in innovation in the information, communications and telecommunications 
fields. This growth was preceded by a significant rise in inequality in the United States, 
leading many to infer that higher levels of inequality seemed to contribute to growth. 
 
More recently, however, this traditional view has been challenged both by cross-
national empirical studies and by theoretical advances. This recent research seems to 
suggest that there is no efficiency-equity tradeoff and that social policy and greater 
equality may actually contribute to higher productivity growth.
6  
 
There are two streams of recent research that point in this direction (Harris, 2002). 
In the early 1990s a number of researchers analyzed cross-sectional and time-series data 
for both developing and developed countries, and identified a robust negative correlation 
between measures of income inequality and economic growth. This evidence would seem 
to suggest that greater equality can actually contribute to stronger economic growth. 
However, the majority of these studies involved samples dominated by developing 
countries. When attention is focused on OECD countries alone, the evidence is far from 
conclusive. Indeed, Harris concludes that the empirical case for a link running from 
greater income equality to higher economic growth for high-income countries is ￿at best 
statistically fragile and at worst insignificant.￿ But he also cautions that there is no 
significant evidence for the traditional idea of a tradeoff between equality and growth. 
 
 The old mythology that there is an inevitable tradeoff between efficiency and 
equality must be set aside. But new ideas suggesting that inequality is harmful for 
economic growth as yet lack compelling empirical support. As a result, the policy-maker 
must make do without convenient intellectual crutches, and the implications of social 
programs for productivity must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. As often is the case, 




Key Themes on the Relationship between Productivity and Social Development 
  
  The two-way or reciprocal relationship between productivity and social 
development is the central theme of this paper. Looking at the first linkage running from 
productivity to social development, productivity increases the amount of material wealth 
that a given hour of labour can produce. However, too often advocates of a productivity 
agenda highlight only its importance for our material standard of living, giving such an 
agenda an unnecessarily narrow political appeal. The additional wealth created by 
productivity growth can be taken in different forms: private consumption, enhanced 
social programs, lower taxes, more leisure time, or some combination of all four of these. 
In effect, productivity growth provides more opportunity for society. Greater productivity 
is not a necessary condition for social progress; indeed, we could choose to devote a 
                                                            
6 On this issue, see the papers in the special issue of the Canadian Public Policy on the linkages between 
economic growth (Fortin, Sharpe, and St-Hilaire, 2003)   25 
larger proportion of our existing income to social purposes if we wished; and certainly 
greater productivity does not guarantee greater social well-being, as Heath (2002) 
correctly emphasizes. 
 
What paths are taken depend on social and political choices. In the real world of 
politics, however, productivity growth does expand the choices open to society, and 
reduces the apparently zero-sum nature of choices inherent in a weak economy. It is no 
accident that the welfare state expanded greatly during the golden years of capitalism 
following the Second World War. There is a social as well as an economic case to be 
made for productivity growth, and it is unfortunate that the advocates of a productivity 
agenda tend to cast it in such narrow terms. 
 
These realities should inform assessments of the performance of different 
countries around the world. Much has been made of the contrast between the economic 
performance of the United States and that of Europe in the last decade. Clearly, the link 
between productivity and living standards, in terms of both levels and growth rates, is 
crucial. Countries with high levels of output per hour tend to have high levels of income, 
as measured by GDP per capita, and countries with rapid labour productivity growth tend 
to have fast GDP per-capita growth.  
 
But certain European countries have very high levels of output per hour but 
relatively low levels of income. This is because average annual hours worked and/or 
labour-force participation are low. The working-age population in these countries thus 
enjoys greater leisure but less income than would be the case if they worked longer and 
had higher labour-force participation. It is misleading to characterize these countries as 
having a lower standard of living than countries with comparable productivity levels and 
higher income levels, when a conscious choice is made to use productivity gains for 
additional leisure instead of income. Indeed, a broadly defined measure of living 
standards or economic well-being would include leisure as well as income. This inclusion 
of leisure, as well as income, in the measurement of living standards thus more fully 
defines and tightens the link between productivity and living standards. Productivity 
growth increases the production possibility frontier of society, allowing both greater 
income and greater leisure. Societies make different choices about which combination of 
these two variables they prefer. 
 
Gaining a socially aware understanding of the role of productivity growth will be 
especially important in the years to come. While labour productivity was the main source 
of advances in living standards in developed countries through the 20th century, other 
factors were also important, including increases in the relative size of the working-age 
component of the population and increased female labour-force participation. These 
trends have by now largely run their course. As noted by a number of contributors, with 
the retirements of the baby boom cohorts and the attainment of high levels of female 
labour-force participation, the contribution of these factors to living-standard growth will 
be considerably smaller in the future. Consequently, productivity growth will become 
even more important, in a relative sense, for the advancement of living standards. 
    26 
Productivity advance is also an essential element of any strategy to ensure the 
sustainability of natural resources and the environment. While environmental 
sustainability is high on the public agenda, there appears to be limited public awareness 
of the positive role that productivity can play. Olewiler (2002) shows that productivity 
growth and technical progress ￿ the two go hand in hand ￿ can contribute substantially to 
sustainability. Technological progress can help improve the functioning of eco-systems 
through the production of more energy-efficient producer and consumer goods and the 
development of products that do less damage to the environment. 
 
  A socially aware understanding of productivity must also incorporate the 
reciprocal nature of the relationship. Productivity growth is influenced by social factors 
that are the manifestations of the social progress of a society. Higher levels of educational 
attainment of the workforce enhance productivity growth. Better health makes workers 
more productive. Stronger communications flows across diverse groups in modern 
multicultural societies promote learning from others and lead to improved productivity.  
 
The role of education is fundamental. At the level of both the individual and 
society, high levels of educational attainment are associated with high productivity and 
high incomes, while low levels have the opposite effect. Indeed, it is impossible to 
imagine a productive 21st-century economy and society that does not have a highly 
literate and numerate workforce. Because of the externalities associated with education 
and training, public policy has an important role to play in fostering human capital 
development.  
 
This perspective also applies to health. It is a well-known fact that improvements 
in population health have also contributed significantly to increased productivity and 
living standards over time. However, the productivity effects of health go well beyond 
those associated with increased life expectancy. We are only now beginning to 
understand the multifaceted nature of the factors that influence the health of the labour 
force and of the population as a whole. 
 
In addition to highlighting the positive role of human capital, it is important to 
clear away traditional mythologies that do not stand up to close scrutiny. The belief that 
there is an inevitable tradeoff between efficiency and equality has long been an 
influential assumption underlying policy debates in Canada and many other Western 
nations. This hardy perennial has been seriously undermined by new research. To be sure, 
the more recent argument that greater equality and social spending actually contribute to 
productivity growth also seems to lack convincing support, at least in the case of 
advanced economies. But in the real world of public policy, debunking the assumption of 
an implicit tradeoff represents a significant corrective to the intuitions and hunches that 
shape choices. The need to assess social programs on a case-by-case basis, without the 
aid of such default positions, may raise the complexities confronting policy-makers. But 
clearing away unsupported intuitions is a healthy contribution to the policy process. 
 
It is time to end the political posturing between the advocates of productivity growth 
and the defenders of social well-being. Doing so requires accommodations on both sides.   27 
Advocates of the productivity agenda need to broaden their focus by highlighting the ways 
in which productivity can enhance social development and recognizing the contribution of 
social well-being to future productivity. But defenders of social development need to 
incorporate productivity into the causes they hold dear. Productivity growth does not 
automatically fulfil collective aspirations, but it increases the choices available to society 
and reduces the zero-sum nature of alternatives facing government decision-makers. 
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III  The CSLS Index of Economic Well-being: Identifying Linkages 
between Productivity and Social Development  
 
 
This section of the paper lays out a framework for identifying and analyzing the 
two-way or bi-directional relationship between productivity and economic and social 
well-being, defined in terms of the four components of the Index of Economic Well-
being developed by the Centre for the Study of Living Standards.
7 The effects of 
productivity gains for the different components of well-being are explored at a conceptual 
level.
8 Then the implications for productivity of independent improvements in the four 
components of economic well-being are discussed.  
 
  The four components or dimensions of economic well-being in the CSLS Index of 
Economic Well-being, which are illustrated on the previous page, are the following:
9 
 
•  effective per capita consumption flows which includes consumption of private 
and public goods and services, and effective per capita flows of household 
production, leisure and other unmarketed goods and services;  
 
•  net societal accumulation of stocks of productive resources, including net 
accumulation of tangible capital, housing stocks, net accumulation of human 
capital, the R&D capital stock, net changes in the value of natural resources 
stocks, costs of environmental degradation, and net change in the level of 
foreign indebtedness; 
 
•  poverty and inequality which includes the intensity of poverty (incidence and 
depth) and the inequality of income; and 
 
•  economic insecurity from job loss and unemployment, illness, family breakup, 
poverty in old age. 
 
A key aspect of the Index is the weighting scheme that is applied to the four basic 
components as different weights produce different results.
10 The weights are subjective 
                                                            
7 In the fall of 1998 the Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS) introduced a new indicator of 
sustainable development for Canada (Osberg and Sharpe, 1998), appropriately called the Index of 
Economic Well-being (IEWB). Since then the CSLS has continued to develop the Index, producing 
estimates for the United States (Osberg and Sharpe, 2002a and 2004), the Canadian provinces (Osberg and 
Sharpe, 2000b), OECD countries (Osberg and Sharpe, 2002b). The Index has stimulated much interest 
among researchers and policy analysts, particularly at the international level.  
8 See Sharpe (2002) for a discussion of the impact of productivity on these variables in the context of the 
postwar Canadian economy.  
9 A detailed discussion of the rationale for the inclusion of the above variables, and the manner in which 
they have been included, in the Index of Economic Well-being is provided in Osberg (1985) and Osberg 
and Sharpe (1998). 
10 Weights are also applied to the sub-components of the equality and economic security components 
because these sub-components are not expressed in constant prices and therefore cannot be aggregated. The 
weights given the poverty intensity and the income inequality are, like the weights given the four 
components, subjective as they reflect the relative valuation placed on these sub-components. In contrast,   29 
and reflect one￿s judgment of the relative importance of the components. In the most 
recent version of the Index, equal weights have been used. This weighting scheme has 
been found the most effective for the presentation of the Index. Based on the equal 
weighting scheme, the Index of Economic Well-being advanced only 16.6 per cent in 
Canada from 1971 to 1999. In contrast, GDP per capita rose 73.0 per cent. 
 
 
The Impact of Productivity on Economic Well-being 
 
   This sub-section explores the impact of productivity for the consumption, stocks 
of wealth, inequality, and economic security components of the Index of Economic Well-
being. 
 
1) Consumption Flows  
 
The concept of consumption flows used in the Index includes private and public 
consumption and unpaid work and makes adjustments for a number of factors, including 
life expectancy, household size, regrettables or negative externalities (cost of commuting, 
crime, auto accidents, and pollution abatement) as well as changes in working time. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
The basic relationship between productivity and consumption is that productivity 
growth increases output and income and income is the key determinant of consumption. 
Productivity increases real income and when people earn more, they spend and consume 
more. Of course, not all increases (in either an absolute or proportionate sense) in income 
arising from productivity gains are spent. A significant proportion is taxed away by 
government, reducing potential private consumption, but potentially increasing public or 
collective forms of consumption and positively affecting the other components of 
economic well-being. A portion is also saved, financing investment.  
 
  The relationship between changes in productivity and changes in marketed 
consumption or the private component of total consumption thus flows through real wage 
gains. At the aggregate level, increased levels of output per hour over long periods of 
time translate into increased real labour compensation per hour as labour￿s share of 
national income has tended to remain relatively constant over time. Growth of real labour 
compensation or income in turn fuels growth of private consumption. 
 
This close long-run relationship or correlation between real wages and 
productivity reflects the fact that real wage growth in an accounting sense is limited by 
increases in the amount of output produced per hour worked. Changes in capital and 
labour￿s share of output can result in divergences between productivity and real growth 
over short periods. But over long periods factor shares have been relatively stable so have 
had little effect on real wage growth.  
 
 
the weights given the four sub-components of economic security have a more objective basis as they reflect 
the relative importance of the group at risk in the total population. 
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The primary causal linkage in the productivity-real wage relationship runs from 
increased productivity to higher real wages. Nevertheless, there can also be a causal 
linkage running from wages to productivity. For example, a large increase in wages can 
have a positive effect on labour productivity through greater substitution of capital for 
labour. In this sense, productivity and real wages are both endogenous variables.  
 
  The relationship between real wages and consumption is mediated by the tax and 
transfer system and saving behaviour. Only part of labour income is spent on consumer 
goods, with the rest going to savings and taxes. Equally, consumer spending is financed 
by transfer payments and investment income from savings. 
 
The long-run relationship between aggregate productivity and real wage growth 
does not hold on an industry or sector basis. The competitive nature of the labour market 
and the wage determination process tend, if not to eliminate, at least to put downward 
pressure on divergences in labour compensation increases across industries, ceteris 
paribus. This explains the relative limited range of sectoral real wage growth. Industries 
with above average productivity gains such as agriculture and communications have seen 
the relative price of their output fall, while sectors with below average gains such as 
personal services see their relative prices rise.  
 
This aggregate relationship is also consistent with increases or decreases in 
earning or wage inequality as such changes merely redistribute income among workers 
and do not affect labour￿s share of national income. If this long-term relationship had not 
held and labour productivity growth had exceeded real labour compensation gains, the 
share of labour in national income would have declined and the share of profits would 
have increased, which has not happened.  
  
  The relationship between productivity gains and changes in non-working time or 
leisure is more complex than the relationship between productivity and private and public 
consumption. From a theoretical perspective, productivity growth gives individuals 
greater choice in the leisure/work tradeoff. Three options are possible. With increased 
productivity, individuals can choose to use all productivity gains for increased leisure, 
foregoing any increase in income. If productivity doubles, everyone could work one half 
the hours currently worked yet still enjoy the same real income level. Second, individuals 
can use productivity gains for both increased leisure and income. Third, individuals can 
forgo all reductions in working time and use all productivity gains for increased income.  
 
The relationship between productivity and working time for the employed 
population is in part mediated by trends in real labour compensation. Higher wages 
arising from productivity gains may entice workers to substitute leisure or non-working 
time for additional income if the labour supply curve is backward-bending. In other 
words, if it takes less time to make the things we need because of productivity gains, 
people may choose to work less. The large fall in working time during the first seven 
decades of the 20
th century provides evidence of this preference for shorter working time. 
This development, predicated on the large real wage gains enjoyed during this period   31 
arising from increased productivity, represents a major increase in the economic well-
being of the workforce not captured by conventional economic statistics.  
 
Since 1970 the downward trend in average hours worked in developed countries 
has ended or even been reversed in certain instances, despite the continued increase in 
productivity and real wage growth, although the pace of this growth has certainly been 
less than in the pre-1970 period. The value of the additional leisure from reduced 
working time below the current levels now appears much less than in the past, at least as 
evidenced by the decisions the workforce has made regarding working time. Institutional 
constraints and rigidities in scheduling may however prevent worker preferences for 
fewer hours from being realized. Surveys show that a considerable number of Canadians 
would prefer to work fewer hours for a prorated cut in wages. But it appears most full-
time workers appear satisfied working 35-40 hours per week and do not desire reductions 
in weekly hours, although they may value increased holidays and vacation time. Certainly 
productivity gains allow society to choose less working time, although at a cost of less 
real income. Many European countries appear to be taking this option, which appears 
much less popular in North America.  
 
  The numbers of years worked over the life cycle is affected by the number of 
years of postsecondary education one pursues and the average age of retirement. 
Decisions determining investment in education and age of retirement are affected at least 
indirectly by the level of productivity or wealth of the society. For example, the decision 
to retire depends on the generosity of public and private pensions. Increased productivity 
and the larger tax base allow a richer enrichment of the public pension system. The rapid 
economic and productivity growth of the postwar period up to 1973 was a key 
precondition for the enrichment of the public pension system. Increases in productivity 
can lead to better returns on private pension plans through rising stock market valuations 
arising from productivity-enhanced earnings, increasing the incentive to retire. 
 
  The decision to pursue postsecondary education may be linked to the rate of 
return on this investment. Increased aggregate productivity growth raises real labour 
compensation and can provide an increased incentive to accumulate human capital, 
particularly if the returns in occupations requiring higher education exceed those for 
occupations with lower educational requirements. The average number of years in 
postsecondary education obtained is also linked to the educational opportunities available 
to the population. A well developed postsecondary education sector allows high 
postsecondary enrolment rates. Again, the large tax base needed to finance such public 
investments is predicated on the wealth of the country, in turn a reflection of high 
productivity levels. 
 
  A strong case can be made that longer life expectancy increases economic well-
being and should be factored into measures of well-being. The Index of Economic Well-
being attempts to capture this by making an upward adjustment in private consumption 
proportionate to the percentage increase in life expectancy. 
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In theory, higher income arising from productivity gains allows individuals to 
purchase better health care or the government to supply better health care services. In the 
immediate postwar almost all health care expenditures were private. With the 
introduction of hospital insurance in the late 1950s and medicare in the mid-1960s public 
health spending became much larger both in absolute terms and as a proportion of total 
health expenditure. Rising real incomes certainly fuelled this increase in health 
expenditures. 
 
  Certain types of consumer expenditures do not contribute to economic well-being, 
but rather are necessary, but regrettable expenditures forced on consumers by the 
exigencies of modern life. A true measure of economic well-being subtracts these 
expenditures from consumption. The Index of Economic Well-being identifies four of 
these regrettables- cost of auto accidents, cost of pollution abatement equipment, costs of 
commuting, and costs of crime, and subtracts these costs from private consumption. 
 
  The relationships between productivity and these four regrettables are complex 
and can be both positive and negative. For example, increased productivity and real 
income can increase the number of auto accidents as there is greater economic activity 
and traffic, but it can reduce accidents through increased public expenditure on safer 
roads. Higher productivity and real income can increase the cost of pollution abatement 
because of higher pollution levels associated with increased economic activity, while at 
the same time with higher income people may be willing to pay for and accept more 
regulation of pollution, reducing pollution abatement costs. The costs of commuting rise 
with higher levels of economic activity as more traffic increases commuting time. The 
costs of commuting can be reduced when a larger tax base allows public investment in 
public transit or highways.  
 
The relationship between productivity and the costs of crime is less clear than for 
the three other types of regrettables. The distribution of productivity and real income 
gains in an uneven and inequitable manner, with the creation of a small very rich class 
may foster crime. More likely, the increased tax base from productivity growth allows the 
possibility of social spending to attack the social roots of crime.  
 
Economic well-being can be improved by the increased supply of public goods 
and public consumption is included in consumption flows in the Index of Economic 
Well-being. Increased income arising from productivity gains results in additional tax 
revenues under almost all types of tax regimes (the exception would be a tax system 
completely funded by a head or poll tax). Part of these revenues can be used to finance 
the provision of public goods and services (e.g. education, health services, parks, defense, 
etc.) without charge or on a heavily subsidized basis to the population and represent 
public consumption, an important part of total consumption. Government expenditures on 
transfers to persons are not included in public consumption, as they are used by the 
recipients to finance private consumption.  
 
Of course, increased productivity thus increases the tax base and allows for, but 
does not automatically lead to, increases in public consumption. With increased income,   33 
governments may choose to lower taxes, or spend the additional revenues in other ways 
(e.g. pay down debt, increase transfer payments, capital spending).  
 
  The Index of Economic Well-being considers unpaid labour, both within the 
household (homework) and outside the household (volunteer work), as contributing to 
economic well-being and adds the value (estimated on a replacement, generalist basis) of 
unpaid work to private and public consumption. Increases in the number of hours of 
unpaid work thus raise economic well-being.  
 
Productivity gains can have indirect effects of the amount of unpaid labour 
undertaken by society. For example, higher productivity increases real incomes and 
workers substitute non-working time for working time and reduce annual hours worked. 
Some of this additional non-work time may be used for household work, or for volunteer 
work.  
 
2) Stocks of Wealth 
  
Stocks of wealth represent the sustainability component of economic well-being. 
While the depletion of stocks of wealth such as natural resources may add to current 
income, it reduces the potential income of future generations and hence should be 
factored into measures of economic well-being that care about intergenerational equity. 
The components of wealth stocks in the Index of Economic Well-being are physical 
capital, research and development capital, human capital, natural resources, net foreign 
debt, and the social costs of environmental degradation. Increases in these components 
(excluding net foreign debt), measured on a constant price, per capita basis, raise 
economic well-being. 
 
The link between productivity and the physical residential and non-residential 
capital stock is direct. Higher productivity leads to higher national income, which means 
higher profits. Profits are a key determinate of investment, and the additional investment 
augments the capital stock. Technological change, the key driver of productivity growth, 
can also have a negative effect on certain components of the capital stock, rendering them 
economically obsolete. But this effect in terms of the aggregate capital stock is normally 
much smaller than the positive effect of productivity and economic growth on investment 
and the capital stock.  
 
The link between productivity and research and development (R&D) is also 
direct. Higher productivity increases income and profits. These additional profits finance 
increased research and development spending that adds to the stock of research and 
development. 
 
Higher productivity and incomes can have at least two effects on human capital. 
First, if people have additional income they may use that to personally accumulate human 
capital through their own expenditure. Second, and more important higher productivity 
and incomes lead to higher tax revenues, giving the government more means to support 
human capital accumulation through investments in the education system.   34 
 
In terms of natural resources, one might think that there is no link between 
productivity and natural resources stocks, or even a negative link. With higher 
productivity and incomes, consumption will increase and consequently our stock of 
natural resources will be run down. And certainly that can happen, as the famous 1972 
Club of Rome report emphasized.  
 
But the stock of natural resources is linked to the price of natural resources. The 
greater demand for natural resources arising from higher incomes raises their prices. 
Higher prices leads to increased supply through more exploration and development, 
which increases the proven stocks of natural resources, as well as reduced demand 
through use of substitutes. In addition, productivity gains through technological advance 
in the natural resource sector can actually increase the stock of resources by lowering 
production costs and making previously non-economically viable reserves economically 
viable. For example, technological change has reduced the cost of extracting oil from the 
tar sands in Northern Alberta, with the result that the size of the economically viable 
reserves have increased significantly. Equally, productivity gains in animal husbandry in 
the farm sector have been impressive. So productivity growth can actually have a positive 
effect on the overall sustainability of resources by reducing the cost of extraction and 
therefore increasing the economic supply of natural resources.  
 
  The link between productivity and net foreign debt is obvious and one can 
hypothesize a number of possible relationships. Higher productivity has implications for 
the balance of payments as it can affect imports, exports and capital flows. A productivity 
and growth boom can suck in imports, increasing foreign debt. Equally, it can create an 
export spurt, due to increased competitiveness, that reduces debt. It may also make the 
country more attractive for foreign investors, and increase debt. There are no a priori 
reasons why any of these tendencies should be dominant. The United States is currently 
enjoying very strong productivity growth and is seeing its foreign debt soar because of a 
large trade deficit.  
 
Like its impact on natural resources, productivity growth can have both a positive 
and negative effect on the environment and on the social costs of environmental 
degradation. Greater economic growth fuelled by productivity growth can increase the 
level of pollution as additional economic activity generates more emissions and waste. 
This is certainly the environmentist perspective on the issue. 
 
But the technological advances associated with productivity growth can also lead 
to cleaner and more environmentally-sensitive production processes that reduce 
environmental degradation. Moreover, richer societies give greater weight to 
environmental problems than poorer societies and are more able and willing to pay the 
price of greater controls on pollution or pay for cleaning up the effects of pollution. 
Richer countries score much better than poor countries for many environmental 
indicators.  
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There is a spirited debate concerning overall trends in the quality of the 
environment in the world and there is no consensus on the issue.
11 To be sure, 
quantification of environmental trends is very difficult.
12 But a case can be made that 
economic and productivity growth are positively associated with improvements in 
environmental quality through a number of mechanisms, including technological 
advances that directly reduce pollution and a high-income elasticity for environmental 
quality. 
 
3) Income Inequality 
 
The degree of equality in society is a component of the overall economic well-
being of that society and there is wide agreement that increases in equality (or decreases 
in inequality) raise economic well-being, at least within the current range of values 
posted for this variable in OECD countries. The Index of Economic Well-being includes 
two income distribution variables, a measure of poverty intensity (the product of the 
poverty rate or incidence and the poverty gap) which reflects the income distribution of 
low-income persons, and the Gini coefficient, which measures the equality of income of 
the overall population. 
 
A key issue in the discussion of the relationship between productivity and poverty 
is whether an absolute or relative concept of poverty is employed. If one uses an absolute 
concept of poverty, then increased incomes through productivity gains can pull 
individuals above the poverty line. There is a direct link between productivity and 
poverty both through the market income people earn and potentially through increased 
government transfers from the expanded tax base for people who are unable to participate 
in market activities.  
 
With a relative definition of poverty, such as the definition used in the Index of 
Economic Well-being of households with less than one half median equivalent income, 
there is less of a direct link between productivity and poverty. If everyone receives the 
same percentage increase in income because of productivity gains, there is no change in 
the relative distribution of income and hence in the poverty rate.  
 
 
                                                          
The impact of economic and productivity growth on the overall income 
distribution of the population is a complex issue. A key consideration is the definition of 
income used, whether market income, money income, which includes transfer payments, 
or after-tax income. Market forces largely influence market income while government 
policies through transfers and taxes directly affect both money income and after-tax 
income and reduce inequality.  
 
 
11 See. for example, the recent book The Skeptical Environmentalist (Lomberg, 2001) and the intense 
debate it has generated. 
12 Problems include the weighting given various environmental indicators, the lack of national time series 
data for many indicators, uncertainty about the effects of environmental trends, and ignorance about the 
existence of threshold effects whereby permanent damage is done once a certain level is reached. Another 
issue is the importance given to the precautionary principle.   36 
 In certain historical circumstances, productivity and economic growth may lead 
to a narrowing of market income differentials as persons at the bottom are brought into 
middle-income jobs. In other situations, growth may be associated with skill-biased 
technical change and benefit the highly skilled and educated to the detriment of the 
poorly educated, increasing market inequalities. As market income inequalities have 
increased in Canada over the last three decades, this second scenario seems more relevant 
to the Canadian experience.  
 
Increased productivity and real income growth also expands the tax base, giving 
the government at least the potential to reduce after-tax income inequality by increasing 
money transfers to low-income individuals, reducing taxes on the poor and raising them 
on the non-poor, and implementing social policies that increase the earning potential of 
the poor. 
 
4) Economic Security 
 
  The degree of economic security in society is a component of the overall 
economic and social well-being of that society and there is wide agreement that increases 
in economic security (or decreases in economic insecurity) raise economic well-being, at 
least within the current range of values posted for this variable in OECD countries. The 
Index of Economic Well-being includes four variables for economic security covering 
four risks facing the population: the risk of unemployment, the risk of financial distress 
caused by illness, the risk of single-parent poverty, and the risk of poverty in old age. 
Increased productivity can reduce all four risks. 
  
In terms of the financial risk arising from unemployment, many people in the past 
have believed that productivity gains would lead to higher unemployment, reducing 
economic well-being. But according to public opinion surveys (Graves and Jenkins, 
2002), three quarters of Canadians do not think that productivity gains are synonymous 
with job losses and believe that in the long run productivity actually can have a positive 
effect on unemployment, or at least not have a negative effect on unemployment. 
Economic theory and analysis support this view. It is now well recognized that it is 
aggregate demand and demographic structures that in the long run determine employment 
and unemployment levels, not the pace of productivity growth.  
 
In addition, with greater productivity, incomes and tax revenues, we can choose to 
have a more generous social welfare system, including greater employment insurance 
coverage and benefits. Higher levels of economic and social well-being would result 
from this greater generosity because the financial risks associated with unemployment 
would be reduced. It is much easier to enrich a social program in periods of rapid growth 
and expanding tax revenues. On the other hand, during periods of weak growth and 
declining revenues, social programs become candidates for retrenchment. 
 
In terms of the financial risks associated with illness, greater productivity gains 
leading to higher incomes and tax revenues again result in a greater possibility of both 
private and public expenditure on health and reduces the financial risk from sickness and   37 
increases economic security. The establishment of medicare in Canada, introduced in the 
mid-1960s during a period of rapid productivity growth and rising tax revenues, 
represented a massive reduction in the financial risk from illness for Canadians. The 
delisting by provincial governments of certain medical procedures in the mid-1990s, 
precipitated by the fiscal crisis arising from weak economic and productivity growth, 
increased the financial risk from illness.  
 
Productivity gains can result in reductions in the rate of poverty for single parent 
families through increases in real wages and through an expanded tax base which allows 
greater generosity of income transfers and provision of services to single parents so they 
can become self-reliant. 
 
The implications of productivity growth for poverty among the elderly is largely 
through the impact of productivity on the ability of government to fund transfers to the 
elderly given the low labour market participation of this group.  
 
 
The Impact of Economic Well-being on Productivity 
 
  The previous sub-section of the paper discussed the linkages running from 
productivity to economic well-being through the four dimensions or components of the 
Index of Economic Well-being. This sub-section looks more briefly at the relationship 
from the other direction, namely, the impact of changes in economic well-being on 
productivity. In many instances, exogenous improvements in a number of the variables 
contributing to economic well-being can boost productivity growth.  
 
1) Consumption Flows 
 
  Increases in real wages, in certain types of government spending, and declines in 
working time, all developments that raise economic well-being, also can increase 
productivity. As noted earlier in the paper, the relationship between real wages and 
productivity can run from wages to productivity as well as from productivity to wages. 
The price of labour relative to other factors of production determines the relative intensity 
of labour used in the production process. Ceteris paribus, the higher the wages, the less 
labour employed, and the higher the average productivity of the labour actually used as 
more capital-intensive methods of production are used. Thus exogenous wage shocks can 
lead to factor adjustments that raise labour productivity to higher levels.  
 
  Government spending in a number of areas including infrastructure, research and 
development spending, and education and training can boost private sector productivity. 
Decreases in the length of the average work week can increase productivity, measured on 
an hours basis, because workers work more intensely within the shorter work period. This 
finding has often been observed when a shorter work week has been introduced.  
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2) Stocks of Wealth 
 
Stocks of wealth are inputs into the economy￿s aggregate production function 
Thus exogenous increases in the capital stock, in the stock of research and development, 
and in human capital, all variables in the sustainability component of economic well-
being, can boost productivity. Investment, innovation, and human capital are the key 
determinants of productivity growth. Degradations of environmental stocks such as soil 
depletion or global warming due to CO2 emissions can have negative effects on 
productivity.  
 
There are feedback mechanisms between productivity and wealth stocks. Virtuous 
circles or spirals are created when higher productivity leads to more investment and 
stocks of wealth, which in turn leads to higher productivity, which in turn leads to more 
income and investment.  
 
3) Income Equality 
 
  The overall impact of inequality on economic growth and productivity is complex 
and still poorly understood, as noted in the first section of this paper. Traditionally, it has 
been argued that inequality is good for economic growth because of the positive incentive 
effects. Recently, a literature has developed that stresses the negative political economy 
effects of inequality as well as the negative effect on human capital accumulation because 
of liquidity constraints on borrowing by the poor to finance education. More research is 
needed on this issue before definitive conclusions can be reached. 
  
4) Economic Security 
 
  As was the case for the impact of inequality on economic and productivity 
growth, the impact of economic security is also poorly understood. Increased economic 
security contributes to productivity growth through the same mechanisms outlined above 
for greater equality and less poverty. Indeed, poverty is a key element in two of the four 
sub-components of the economic security component in the Index of Economic Well-
being. If people feel that they are more secure, both in term of income and employment, 
they may be willing to make more investments in human capital. Again, it should be 
noted that there are positive feedback mechanisms running from productivity to 
economic security and then from economic security back to productivity. Again, more 
research is needed on this issue before definitive conclusions can be reached. 
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IV  Empirical Evidence on the Linkage between Productivity and 
Poverty in Developing Countries 
 
This section of the paper examines the empirical evidence on the linkage between 
productivity, both in terms of levels and rates of growth, and poverty in developing 
countries. The first sub-section examines the contribution of productivity growth to 
economic growth and GDP per capita growth in developing countries. The second sub-
section explores the empirical relationship between productivity and poverty in 
developing countries.  
 
 
Contribution of Productivity Growth to Economic and GDP per Capita Growth in 
Developing Countries 
 
  Economic growth and income growth (GDP per capita growth) in the three 
regional aggregates of developing countries can be decomposed into components to show 
the relative contribution labour productivity has made to these two variables.
13  
 
1) The Contribution of Productivity Growth to Economic Growth 
 
  Economic growth can be decomposed into growth in output per worker and 
growth in employment, with the latter in turn decomposable into population growth and 
growth in the employment/total population ratio.
14 Exhibit 1 provides summaries of the 
percentage contributions summaries for the three regions or continents.  
 
Based on both the Penn Table and the KILM-GGDC data set, economic growth 
was the slowest in Africa over the last three decades, with real GDP rising at only an 
average annual rate of 2.71 per cent and 3.10 per cent respectively. It was followed by 
Latin America at 3.65 per cent per year and Asia at 5.97 per cent based on the Penn 
Table. The KILM-GGDC equivalents were 3.49 per cent and 5.94 per cent respectively. 
 
  Given the negative productivity growth observed from the Penn Table data, 
output per worker made a negative contribution to output growth in Africa, with 
population growth accounting for all economic growth. In contrast, in Asia, the robust 
productivity growth accounted for 63.8 per cent of output growth, with population growth 
accounting for 30.8 per cent. Latin America was between Africa and Asia, with 
productivity growth accounting for 22.2 per cent of output growth, population growth 
59.7 per cent, and employment/total population growth 18.4 per cent. The story is 
                                                            
13 Two different data sets have been used to conduct this analysis and both show similar trends.  The first 
one is based on the Penn World Table, version 6.1.  The regional aggregates do not include all of the 
countries available from the Penn World Table.  The data set was build to include only the countries for 
which Sala-i-Martin (2002) published poverty rates.  Therefore the growth rates for the African aggregate 
should be interpreted as a proxy of the African growth rate and the same goes for the other two regional 
aggregates.  The other data set is the Key Indicators of the Labour Market and Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre (KILM-GGDC) data set. 
14 See CSLS (2003a) for all data behind the estimates in this paper.   40 
essentially the same using KILM-GGDC data with the difference that labour productivity 





GDP Growth and its Components in Developing Regions, 1970-1998, based on the 
Penn World Table and the KILM-GGDC Data Set 
 
     GDP Growth    Pop   GDP/worker    Empl/Pop   
 
  Penn World Table Estimates 
 
  Africa  2.71  2.80  -0.08  0.0    
  % Contribution  100.0  103.3  -3.0  0.0 
  Latin America  3.65  2.18  0.81  0.67 
  % Contribution  100.0  59.7  22.2  18.4 
  Asia  5.97  1.84  3.81  0.23 
  % Contribution  100.0  30.8  63.8  3.9 
 
  KILM-GGDC Estimates 
 
  Africa  3.10  2.77  0.36  -0.04 
  % Contribution  100.0  89.3  11.6  -1.2 
  Latin America  3.49  2.10  0.76  0.59 
  % Contribution  100.0  60.3  21.7  17.0 
  Asia  5.94  1.85  3.42  0.58 
  % Contribution  100.0  31.1  57.5  9.7 
 
Source: CSLS (2003a:Tables 4 and 5). 
 
 
One observes that the greater the output growth, the greater the productivity 
growth in both absolute and relative terms. When economic growth is strong, 
productivity growth will represent the lion￿s share of output growth, in part because 
employment and population are supply-constrained. Consequently, the importance of 
population growth for economic growth is in inverse proportion to the strength of 
economic growth.  
 
2) The Contribution of Productivity Growth to GDP Per Capita Growth 
 
  Growth in living standards, proxied by GDP per capita can be decomposed into 
growth in output per worker and growth in the employment/total population ratio. Exhibit 2 
provides a summary for the three regions or continents. 
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Exhibit 2 
 
GDP Per Capita Growth and its Components in Developing Regions, 1970-1998, 
based on the Penn World Table and the KILM-GGDC data set 
 
       GDP/Capita  GDP/Worker  Empl/Pop   
 
  Penn World Table Estimates 
 
 Africa  -0.08  -0.08  0.00     
  % Contribution  100.0  100.0   0.0 
  Latin  America  1.44 0.81 0.67     
  %  Contribution  100.0 56.3 46.5 
  Asia  4.05 3.81 0.23     
 %  Contribution  100.0  94.1  5.7 
 
 KILM-GGDC  Estimates 
 
 Africa 0.32  0.36  -0.04     
  % Contribution  100.0  111.3   -11.3 
  Latin  America  1.35 0.76 0.59     
  %  Contribution  100.0 55.8 43.9 
  Asia  4.02 3.42 0.58     
  %  Contribution  100.0 85.1 14.4 
 
Source: CSLS (2003a:Tables 6 and 7). 
 
 
  Based on Penn World Data, of the three continents, Africa experienced the worst 
performance in terms of living standards over the last three decades, with real GDP per 
capita actually falling at an average annual rate of 0.08 per cent. It was followed by Latin 
America with a 1.44 per cent annual gain and Asia at a strong 4.05 per cent. Data from 
the KILM and GGDC databases tell a similar story with Africa experiencing the worst 
record in terms of growth in living standards. But since estimates by regions are 
aggregates of a different set of countries (the aggregate based on Penn Table includes 27 
countries while the one based on KILM includes only 10), growth is slightly higher at 
0.32 per cent a year on average. GDP per capita growth in Latin America and Asia are 
very close to their Penn Table equivalent at 1.35 per cent and 4.02 per cent respectively.  
 
  Output per worker growth accounted for slightly over half of GDP per capita 
growth in Latin America, irrespective of the data source used (56.3 per cent based on the 
Penn Table and 55.8 based on the KILM and GGDC databases). Increases in the 
employment/total population ratio accounted for the remaining growth in living standards 
(46.5 per cent according to the Penn Table and 43.9 per cent based on KILM-GGDC). In 
Asia, almost all the growth in living standards was accounted for by productivity gains 
(94.1 per cent and 85.1 per cent). The percentage contributions for Africa have little   42 
meaning because of the low value for GDP per capita growth (-0.08 per cent and 0.32 per 
cent) upon which the calculations are based.  
 
One observes that the greater the GDP per capita growth, the greater the 
productivity growth in both absolute and relative terms. When productivity growth is 
robust, increases in living standards follow.
15 
 
  The bottom line from the discussion above is that productivity gains are the 
driving force behind income gains, and their relative importance actually increases as 
productivity growth picks up. 
 
 
                                                          
The Empirical Relationship Between Productivity, Poverty, and Income Inequality 
 
  This sub-section regroups the statistical analysis that was done using the different 
data sources to study the relationship between key variables. The first set of relationships 
studied is the one between productivity and poverty, focusing on both changes in 
productivity and poverty reduction and on the level of productivity and poverty 
incidence. The relationships between GDP growth and poverty and per capita GDP and 
poverty are also examined and compared and contrasted to the productivity/poverty 
relationships. The second set of relationships is the more complex relationship between 
labour productivity, poverty and income inequality, both in terms of levels and growth. 
The third set of relationships examined are those between labour productivity levels and 
growth and poverty incidence and changes, but using alternative measures of poverty 
developed by the UNDP, namely the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Human 
Poverty Index (HPI).  
 
 
The Relationship Between Productivity and Poverty Using Simple Regression 
Analysis 
 
  This sub-section explores the link between productivity and poverty as a bivariate 
relationship. It first uses two Sala-i-Martin poverty estimates and bases the regressions on 
both productivity growth rates and changes in poverty and productivity levels and the 
level of poverty. It then repeats the analysis using World Bank poverty estimates 
 
 
15 Again, the experiences of certain countries are noteworthy. Despite the dismal performance of Africa, 
two countries on this continent exhibited very significant increases in living standards because of their 
strong productivity growth ￿ Botswana and Mauritius.  In the KILM-GGDC data set Botswana and 
Mauritius are not available and therefore, Egypt had the fastest growth in living standards.  Barbados 
enjoyed the strongest increases in living standards in Latin America and also had the strongest productivity 
gains in the region. According to the KILM-GGDC data set, Chile had the highest real GDP per capita 
growth rate in Latin America. Most Asian countries experienced strong GDP per capita growth thanks to 
their strong productivity growth and this true is in both data sets.  
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  The literature has focused on the relationship between economic growth and 
poverty and not on the relationship between productivity and poverty.
16 One reason that 
may explain why productivity has been neglected in the literature as a determinant of 
poverty reduction is that economic growth already subsumes productivity growth. It may 
have been felt that its impact was already covered. Economic growth can reduce poverty 
both by raising real wages and creating jobs. The difficulty of obtaining reliable labour 
input data in most developing countries, needed to calculate labour productivity, may 
have contributed to the use of GDP per capita or mean income in poverty reduction 
studies as well. 
 
  Exhibit 3, based on data from the Penn World Tables and the KILM-GGDC data 
set, presents the R-squared coefficients from regressions of changes in poverty on 
economic growth, changes in poverty on per capita GDP growth, and changes in poverty 
on productivity growth as measured by output per worker growth, and for both the one 
dollar and two dollar poverty measures over the 1970-98 period for the three regions of 
the developing world and the overall developing world. The relationship between growth 
in real GDP, per capita GDP, or productivity and changes in poverty is negative in all 
instances. Poverty tends to fall with economic growth, with income growth, and with 
productivity growth. The relationship between productivity growth and the change in 
poverty for all developing countries is shown based on the Penn World Tables estimates 
in Chart 1 for the one dollar poverty measure and in Chart 2 for the two dollar poverty 
measure. 
 
A first observation is that there are significant differences in results between the 
two data sets. In general, the relationship between growth in the three economic variables 
and poverty reduction is considerably better explained using the Penn World Tables data 
than the KILM-GGDC data. Out of 24 R-squared coefficients (three variables for four 
geographical areas, and two poverty measures), the Penn World Tables values are higher 
in 20 cases. The only exceptions are the two dollar poverty estimates for all three 
economic variables and one dollar poverty estimates for real GDP for Latin America 
where the KILM-GGDC estimates are higher. The most dissimilar results between the 
two data sets are for Africa where the Penn World Tables show a consistently tight 
relationship between the three economic variables and poverty while the same 
relationships are in most cases poorly explained by the KILM-GGDC data. 
 
                                                            
16 See CSLS (2003a) for a review of the literature on the relationship between economic growth and 
poverty in developing countries.   44 
Exhibit 3 
 
R-Squared Coefficients between Economic Growth, Per Capita GDP Growth and 
Productivity Growth and Changes in Poverty, based on Penn World Tables and  
KILM-GGDC Data 
  
Penn World Table 
One dollar a day poverty measure 
   Asia*     LA   Africa      Developing  Countries 
                R - s q u a r e d   C o e f f i c i e n t      
Real  GDP    0.010   0.131   0.517   0.455      -6.19 
Real  GDP  per  capita   0.171   0.289   0.699   0.527      -6.40 
Productivity    0.197   0.228   0.528   0.496      -6.25 
 
Two dollars a day poverty measure 
Real  GDP    0.318   0.256   0.519   0.569      -9.56 
Real  GDP  per  capita   0.489   0.454   0.691   0.673      -9.99 
Productivity    0.481   0.379   0.694   0.626      -9.71 
 
KILM-GGDC 
        One dollar a day poverty measure 
    Asia*     LA   Africa      Developing  Countries 
             R - s q u a r e d   C o e f f i c i e n t    
Real  GDP    0.0058   0.2436   0.0721   0.1118      -2.51 
Real  GDP  per  capita   0.0106   0.1848   0.410   0.1266      -2.25 
Productivity    0.0050   0.1897   0.0003   0.1295      -2.66 
 
Two dollars a day poverty measure 
Real  GDP    0.2042   0.7238   0.1244   0.2266      -5.26 
Real  GDP  per  capita   0.2618   0.6378   0.1167   0.2622      -4.77 
Productivity    0.2959   0.6128   0.0338   0.2988      -5.97 
 
Source. CSLS (2003a:Appendix Table 26). Also see the Appendix Charts. 
*Asia excluding Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. These four countries had no or virtually no 
poverty in either 1970 or 1998 according to the Sala-i-Martin poverty data base. 
Note: The relationship between growth in real GDP, per capita GDP, or productivity and changes in 
poverty is a negative one in each case considered. 
 
   
The differences in results between data sets may reflect differences in the number 
of countries in the sample. For the Penn World Tables, the results are based on data for 
20 African countries, 19 Latin American countries, and 13 Asian countries for a total of 
52 countries. For the KILM-GGDC data set, the results are based on data for 6 Latin 
American countries, 7 African countries, and 13 Asian countries for a total of 26 
countries. The fact that the number of countries in the Penn World Table is double that of 
the KILM-GGDC data set suggests the former results may be more robust as the greater 
sample size provides more degrees of freedom.  
 
Despite the stronger fit of the relationship between the three economic variables 
and poverty reduction found in the Penn World Tables compared to the KILM-GGDC 
data set, there is one common pattern in the results across the two data sets. The   45 
 
Chart 1: Relationship Between GDP per Worker Growth and the Change in the $1 a day Poverty Rate in 
Developing Countries, 1970-1998
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Sources: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten.  Penn World Table, Version 6.1. Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. 









Venezuela  46 
 
Chart 2: Relationship Between GDP per Worker Growth and the Change in the $2 a day Poverty Rate in 
Developing Countries, 1970-1998
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Sources: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten.  Penn World Table, Version 6.1. Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. 
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R-squared coefficients for the two dollar poverty measure are always higher than the one 
dollar estimates. This reflects the higher poverty rates for the two dollar measure and 
hence the greater potential for decline. This potential is often realized, meaning that there 
are fewer countries displaying no change in poverty so that the linear relationship fits 
more accurately, producing a higher R-squared coefficient. 
 
  Focusing on the Penn World Table results because of their potentially greater 
robustness, the most significant observation is that the R-squared coefficients in all three 
regions (but not for all developing countries) for both poverty measures from the 
regressions of changes in poverty on productivity growth are greater than those from the 
regressions of changes in poverty on economic growth. Productivity growth thus seems 
to have more explanatory power in terms of changes in poverty than economic growth.  
 
Part of economic growth reflects employment growth arising from population 
growth. This growth, which does not increase the employment to population ratio, may 
have little impact on poverty reduction. Its effect is more to keep poverty from rising than 
to reduce it. This would explain why the relationship between economic growth and 
poverty is, at least for the likely more robust Penn World Tables results, always 
considerably weaker than that between both income growth and poverty and productivity 
growth and poverty.  
 
For the three economic variables under study, the variable with the best fitting 
relationship with changes in poverty across almost all regions and both poverty measures, 
at least for the results based on the Penn World Tables data is per capita GDP or income. 
This is not surprising as it is increased income on a per capita basis which reduces the 
incidence of poverty. 
 
The fit of the relationship between productivity or output per worker growth and 
poverty reduction in most regions tends to be in an intermediate position between that of 
GDP growth and poverty reduction and per capita GDP growth and poverty reduction. 
This is explained by the fact that there is not a one-to-one relationship between 
productivity increases and per capita income increases because of changes in the 
employment to population ratio. If productivity rises, but proportionately fewer persons 
are working because of layoffs, poverty will not fall just as per capita income will not 
rise. Consequently, one would expect a tighter relationship between per capita income 
changes and poverty reduction than between productivity growth and poverty reduction. 
On the other hand, the relationship between changes in productivity and poverty will tend 
to be stronger than the relationship between GDP growth and poverty as the latter 
includes employment growth associated with population growth which has no effect on 
poverty reduction. 
 
The results based on the Penn World Tables (in stark contrast to the KILM-
GGDC based results) show high R-squared coefficients between all three economic 
variables and poverty reduction for Africa. This reflects the high poverty rates in this 
region and hence the greater scope for poverty reduction in absolute terms. 
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In terms of the magnitude of these relationships, the final column in Exhibit 3 
shows the estimated slope coefficients. All estimates are statistically significant at the 5 
per cent level or better. These estimates indicate by how much the change in poverty is 
reduced by a given change in the independent variable (the growth rate of either GDP, 
GDP per capita or productivity) across all developing countries on average. For example, 
a 1.00 percentage point increase in the annual rate of growth of productivity decreases the 
change in the $1 a day poverty rate between 1970 and 1998 by 6.25 percentage points. 
 
Looking first at the estimates based on Penn data, it is GDP per capita growth that 
has the greatest power in reducing changes in poverty, both when the $1 measure is used 
and when the $2 measure is used. Productivity growth is a close second, while GDP 
growth has the least power in reducing changes in poverty. Note that the coefficients are 
larger in absolute magnitude in the $2 regressions than in the $1 regressions in each case, 
however. This implies that a given percentage point increase in one of the independent 
variables decreases the change in the $2 a day poverty rate to a larger degree than the 
change in the $1 a day poverty rate. This is a favourable result because it means that 
income growth, for example, lifts the extremely poor not just above the $1 a day poverty 
line but above the $2 a day poverty line as well. In the example, the estimated coefficient 
tells us that the $2 poverty rate grows by 10 points less than it otherwise would if GDP 
per capita grows at a rate 1.00 percentage points higher, while the $1 poverty rate grows 
by only 6.4 points less. The $2 poverty rate is composed of two parts though, the $1 
poverty rate and the proportion of the population with between $1 and $2 a day. The 
results tell us that the change in this latter part is reduced to a larger degree than the 
change in the former part, so in other words, growth is not reducing the change in the 
proportion of the population with less than $1 a day simply by increasing the change in 
the proportion of the population with between $1 and $2 a day.
17 
 
Turning now to the results of the KILM-GGDC regressions, this same conclusion 
holds, that is, the decrease in the change of the $2 poverty rate in response to a given 
increase in the growth of productivity, GDP per capita or GDP is larger than the decrease 
in the change of the $1 poverty rate. The effects in both cases are much smaller in 
magnitude than in the Penn regressions though. There is another difference with the Penn 
results as well, namely, productivity growth and GDP growth both have more power in 
reducing the change in poverty than GDP per capita growth. This is a somewhat 
unexpected result, although not entirely implausible. However, it should be stated again 
                                                            
17 It is important to realize, however, that part of this result of larger coefficients from the $2 regressions 
could be interpreted as an artifact of the treatment of the data.  The poverty rates are measured in 
percentage points, and the change in the poverty rates is an absolute change rather than a per cent change, 
thus the changes are measured in percentage points as well.  But the $2 poverty rates are by nature larger 
than the $1 poverty rates, and a 10 percentage point change from a large number (for example from 70 per 
cent to 60 per cent) does not necessarily represent a larger relative change than a 6.4 percentage point 
change from a smaller number (for example from 45 per cent to 38.6 per cent).  In the example each 
percentage point change corresponds roughly to a relative change of  
-14 per cent.  Thus, in response to a given increase in the rate of growth of income, for example, the 
relative change in the growth of the $2 poverty rate may not be as much greater than the relative change in 
the growth of the $1 poverty rate as compared to the difference in absolute changes.  Whether one values 
relative decreases in the change in the poverty rate over absolute decreases is a normative question though.   49 
that the KILM-GGDC sample is much smaller than the Penn sample and hence the results 
may not be as reliable. 
 
  The previous results suggest that growth in the incidence of poverty is reduced as 
labour productivity growth rises. We expect a similar result to hold in terms of the levels 
of productivity and poverty. Countries having higher levels of labour productivity should 
have lower levels of poverty incidence. We report the R-squared coefficients from 
regressions of poverty incidence on real GDP per worker using both the Penn World 
Tables and the KILM-GGDC estimates for the year 1998. R-squared coefficients are also 
reported for the relationship between the level of per capita GDP and poverty (Exhibit 4). 
All estimated slope coefficients from these regressions have a negative sign as expected 
but the goodness of fit varies across regions. The estimated relationship for all developing 
countries is shown in Chart 3 for the one dollar poverty measure and in Chart 4 for the 
two dollar measure. 
 
For the eight R-squared coefficients from the regressions of the poverty rate on 
the productivity level for each data set (four geographical regions and two productivity 
measures), the estimates based on the Penn World Tables exceeded those of the KILM-
GGDC data set four times and the KILM-GGDC data set exceeded the Penn World table 
estimates four times. In contrast to the growth rate estimates in the previous section, the 
relationship between productivity levels and poverty rates does not appear to be tighter in 
the Penn World Tables than in the KILM-GGDC data set. 
 
  The R-squared coefficients for the productivity/poverty level relationship are the 
highest in Africa, independent of the productivity estimate used. The KILM-GGDC 
estimates produce a coefficient of 0.512 when the one dollar a day poverty measure is 
used and a higher coefficient of 0.671 for the two dollar a day measure. Using the Penn 
World Tables estimates yields a higher R-squared coefficient of 0.717 using the two 
dollars a day poverty measure, but a lower one using the one dollar a day measure of 
0.482.  
 
The fit of the linear relationship between poverty and productivity levels is 
weaker in Latin America than in Africa. The R-squared coefficients for the one and two 
dollars a day poverty measures based on the KILM-GGDC data set are 0.239 and 0.593 
respectively. The coefficients derived from the Penn World Tables estimates were of the 
same magnitude, 0.339 and 0.539 respectively. 
 
The fit of the relationship between labour productivity and poverty levels is also 
weak in the Asian region. Based on the KILM-GGDC estimates and the one dollar 
poverty measure, the R-squared coefficient is 0.295, higher than the one for Latin 
America. When the two dollars a day poverty measure is used, the correlation coefficient 
for Asia is lower at 0.492. Using the Penn World Tables estimates did not improve the 
goodness of fit as the R-squared coefficients for Asia associated with the one and two 
dollars a day poverty measures are 0.188 and 0.336 respectively.   50 
Chart 3: Relationship Between GDP per Worker and the $1 a day Poverty Rate in Developing Countries, 
1998
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Chart 4: Relationship Between GDP per Worker and the $2 a day Poverty Rate in Developing Countries, 
1998
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Exhibit 4 
 
R-squared Coefficients between Levels of Real GDP per Capita and Labour 
Productivity, and Poverty Incidence, 1998, based on Penn World Tables and KILM-
GGDC data 
 
Penn World Table 
One dollar a day poverty measure 
  Asia*   LA   Africa    Developing  Countries 
           R - s q u a r e d     C o e f f i c i e n t  
Real GDP per capita    0.230    0.286    0.490    0.415   -0.0039 
Productivity    0.188   0.339   0.482      0.453      -0.0017 
 
Two dollars a day poverty measure 
 
Real GDP per capita    0.449    0.489    0.725    0.590   -0.0063 
Productivity    0.336   0.539   0.717      0.627      -0.0027 
 
KILM-GGDC 
        One dollar a day poverty measure 
 
   Asia   LA   Africa      Developing  Countries 
           R - s q u a r e d     C o e f f i c i e n t  
Real GDP per capita    0.272    0.268    0.524    0.185    -0.0015 
Productivity    0.295   0.239   0.512      0.228        -0.0007 
 
Two dollars a day poverty measure 
 
Real GDP per capita    0.472    0.570    0.674    0.368    -0.0029 
Productivity    0.492   0.593   0.671      0.430        -0.0014 
 
Source: CSLS (2003a:Appendix Table 26). Also see the Appendix Charts. 




Overall, when the three regions are aggregated, the R-squared coefficients take 
intermediate values between the results of Africa and Latin America. The fit of the linear 
relationship between poverty and labour productivity is tighter when the Penn World 
Tables estimates are used for both the one and two dollars a day poverty measures.  
 
  The relationship between the level of GDP per capita and poverty is very similar 
to that between the level of productivity and poverty. For certain geographical areas and 
poverty measures the fit is stronger, for others it is weaker. When the Penn World Tables 
estimates of income and labour productivity are used in the regressions, the labour 
productivity variable has more explanatory power three times and the income variable 
has more explanatory power five times. When the KILM-GGDC estimates are used in the 
regressions, the labour productivity variable has the most explanatory power five times 
and the income variable three times. But in most of the cases, there is not much   53 
difference in the values the R-squared coefficients take. Generally speaking, neither of 
the two variables seems to be a better explanatory variable than the other. 
 
In terms of the magnitude of these relationships, per capita GDP has more power 
in reducing poverty incidence than productivity, with both poverty measures and in both 
data sets. For an increase of $1,000 in real value added per worker the $1 a day poverty 
rate falls by about 1.7 percentage points according to the Penn estimates or about 0.7 
points according to the KILM-GGDC estimates. The corresponding declines in the 
poverty rate for an equal increase in GDP per capita are 3.9 and 1.5 percentage points 
respectively, more than twice as large as the productivity effects. A similar story holds 
for the estimates based on the $2 poverty rates. 
 
 
                                                          
Once again a given change in the independent variable (this time either the level 
of GDP per capita or the level of productivity) has a greater effect on the $2 poverty rate 
than the $1 poverty rate. This indicates that a given increase in the level of GDP per 
capita or productivity lifts the extremely poor not just above the $1 a day poverty line but 
above the $2 a day poverty line as well. Another similarity with the results from the 
growth regressions is that the independent variable has a smaller effect on the poverty 
rate according to the KILM-GGDC sample.
18 
 
Similar exercises can be carried out using World Bank poverty data, examining 
both the relationship between changes in poverty and the growth of income or 
productivity and the relationship between poverty incidence and income or productivity 
levels. The problem with this data set is that there are few observations in terms of 
looking at these relationships over time. The method here has therefore been to pool all 
available observations and look at the average relationship that holds across all countries 
in the sample over time. The results are quite similar to those presented above based on 
Sala-i-Martin poverty estimates, despite the difference in coverage, so do not need to be 
considered here in detail.  
 
Since the World Bank poverty database has been the traditional data source for 
cross-country investigations of growth￿s effect on poverty, it would be interesting to use 
this data source along with the KILM-GGDC data for productivity and GDP per capita in 
following more closely the methods of other studies. Using the World Bank poverty and 
 
18 It is possible that the linear functional form does not fit the entire sample well.  The countries in the 
sample can be divided into two fairly distinct clusters, one with low poverty levels spread across a broad 
range of high levels of output per worker, and the other with a broad range of poverty levels across a 
narrow band of low productivity levels.  The fit of these regressions could therefore be much improved in 
either of two ways.  First, an inverse functional form could be adopted, or second, the samples could be 
separated into countries with low productivity levels and countries with high productivity levels (or by 
distinguishing between countries with high and low poverty rates) based on some arbitrary break point.  
Also, since some countries in the sample have a poverty rate of zero, a Tobit specification could be called 
for to deal with this truncation.  In any case, the more important point is that the average effect of 
productivity on poverty incidence across all countries in the sample does not represent well the relationship 
that is likely to hold for any individual country in the sample.  Countries with very low levels of 
productivity seem to get a much larger reward for increasing their productivity levels in terms of a reduced 
poverty rate than countries that already have high productivity levels and low poverty incidence and for 
whom poverty incidence has little or no room to fall further.   54 
income distribution database and the KILM-GGDC data set, we estimate elasticities of 
poverty incidence with respect to labour productivity. Elasticities are calculated using 
GDP per capita as well as GDP per worker, for both low and high income inequality 
countries. We classify countries based on their GINI index ranking within our sample. 
The half with the lowest GINI indexes are considered low inequality and the rest are 
considered high inequality. Our definition of inequality is therefore relative in the sense 
that a GINI index value is considered high or low depending on the other GINI indexes in 
the sample. Since our sample includes GINI indexes based on expenditure and income as 
well, we subtract ten percentage points from GINI indexes based on income in order to 
make data comparable although in a non-rigorous way.  
 
We start by regressing the natural logarithm of productivity on the natural 
logarithm of poverty incidence. All countries and years are pooled together. By doing so, 
the slope coefficient is an elasticity. The interpretation of an elasticity is: a one per cent 
rise in labour productivity is associated with a X per cent decline in the incidence of 
poverty (not percentage point). All the elasticity estimates calculated using this 
methodology are statistically significant at the one per cent level (with the exception of 
some estimates from regressions of high inequality countries using the one dollar a day 
poverty measure). Yet there seems to be an auto-correlation problem when all countries 




This problem has motivated the use of a second methodology. We regress the 
average annual growth rate of labour productivity on the average annual growth of the 
incidence of poverty (yearly average of log differences). Under this method, average 
growth is calculated between each data point available within a country. This is not 
strictly speaking an elasticity. It is rather a growth elasticity and its interpretation differs 
from the elasticity interpretation as we will explain later. Using the second methodology, 
there are almost no signs of auto-correlation but the statistical significance of the slope 
coefficients is not as good, but still quite strong. The inequality rankings of log 
differences are based on the GINI index of the latest year used in calculating the average 
log difference. 
 
  The elasticities of poverty incidence with respect to labour productivity derived 
from our data set indicate that growth in labour productivity reduces the incidence of 
poverty. When all data points are used in the regression, the elasticity indicates that a one 
per cent rise in labour productivity will be associated with a 0.74 per cent decline in the 
incidence of poverty on average. The separation of our data set based on the GINI index 
rankings allows us to evaluate the impact of income inequality on the poverty reducing 
power of labour productivity growth. In countries with the lowest GINI indexes, we find 
that a one per cent rise in labour productivity is associated with a 1.02 per cent decline in 
the incidence in poverty. The impact of a one per cent rise in labour productivity on 
                                                            
19 The Durbin-Watson Statistic indicates the presence of auto-correlation if it is significantly lower than 2.  
The presence of auto-correlation prevents any reliable inference from statistical results.  Note that the 
Durbin-Watson statistics derived from the models with high inequality and all countries are very low, 
which calls for caution when interpreting these results.   55 
poverty incidence is less important when income inequality is higher as the -0.45 
elasticity estimate indicates.  
 
The previous results are obtained using the percentage of population living with 
less than one dollar a day (1.08 dollars based on 1993 PPPs). When the two dollars a day 
poverty measure is used, the elasticities are systematically lower indicating that the 
poverty reducing power of labour productivity is lower when the poverty line is set 
higher. This is in contrast to the slope coefficients, which are simple rates of change 
rather than elasticities, from previous regressions, where the independent variable had a 
larger effect on the $2 poverty rate compared to the $1 poverty rate. The difference is that 
elasticities look at per cent changes, so the effect on the poverty rate is in relative (per 
cent) terms rather than absolute (percentage point) terms.
20 Although the elasticities 
derived from the two dollars a day poverty rate are lower, the use of this broader poverty 
measure systematically yields a higher R-squared value, indicating that labour 
productivity variations explain a larger portion of the variations in poverty. The negative 
impact of higher income inequality on the poverty reducing power of labour productivity 
growth also applies when the two dollar a day poverty measure is used. 
 
 
                                                          
Elasticities of poverty incidence with respect to GDP per capita are also estimated 
in the same way and the results are similar in terms of magnitude but are all lower. This 
result shows the importance of giving as much attention to labour productivity as a 
poverty reducing variable as to GDP per capita growth. 
 
  As was mentioned earlier, we also estimate elasticities of growth by regressing 
average log differences instead of just logs. When all countries are pooled together, we 
obtain an elasticity of -3.39, which is considerably larger than the -0.74 estimate we 
obtained from the log-log model. The interpretation of the slope coefficient is different 
and this explains why the two types of elasticities calculated are of different magnitudes. 
A -3.39 growth elasticity means that a one percentage point higher average annual growth 
rate in labour productivity will be associated on average to a 3.39 percentage point lower 
average annual growth rate in the incidence of poverty. Therefore, when the growth 
elasticity is lower than -1, the acceleration in the decline of the incidence in poverty will 
be larger than the acceleration in the growth of labour productivity. Based on our sample, 
an acceleration in labour productivity growth has more impact on the acceleration of the 
decline in the incidence of poverty in countries with higher levels of income inequality. 
High inequality countries have on average a growth elasticity of -4.93 compared to -3.17 
for low inequality countries. 
 
  The growth elasticity estimates derived from the two dollars a day poverty rates 
are systematically lower, as was the case when elasticities were calculated. When all 
countries are pooled together, the growth elasticity is -1.26. When countries are separated 
based on their level of income inequality, the growth elasticities are -1.09 and -1.91 for 
low inequality and high inequality countries respectively. Contrary to what was observed 
 
20 A previous footnote also discusses this issue.  Briefly, the two dollars a day poverty rates are by nature 
larger than the one dollar poverty rates, and in relative terms a large absolute change from a large number is 
not necessarily as large as a small absolute change from a small number.   56 
when elasticities were estimated, the use of the two dollars a day poverty measure does 
not yield a higher R-squared coefficient. In fact, variations in labour productivity growth 
explain more of the variations in poverty incidence growth when the one dollar a day 
poverty measure is used. 
 
  The results using GDP per capita average annual growth rates are quite different 
than the ones obtained with labour productivity. The elasticity estimates are lower and 
have less statistical significance. The R-squared values are also very low, meaning that 
GDP per capita average annual growth has almost no explanatory power of variations in 
poverty incidence average annual growth. 
 
 
                                                          
Following Moore and White (2003), we construct a table of annual labour 
productivity growth rates required to leave the absolute number of poor unchanged, given 
population growth rates and elasticities of poverty incidence with respect to labour 
productivity. From Exhibit 5, we see that for a given elasticity, the growth in labour 
productivity has to be higher the larger is population growth in order to leave the poverty 
headcount unchanged. And unsurprisingly, given a population rate of change, labour 
productivity growth can be lower as the elasticity of poverty incidence with respect to 
labour productivity (which measures the impact of a one per cent change in labour 
productivity on the incidence of poverty) is larger, in order to leave the number of poor 
unchanged. If labour productivity growth exceeds the value in the table for given 
population growth and elasticity, then the number of poor will decrease. 
 
The values in Exhibit 5 are derived using the following formula:  
 
l* = - p / ε 
 
where l* is the annual rate of change in labour productivity required to leave the number 
of poor unchanged, p is the annual rate of change in population, and ε is the poverty 
incidence to labour productivity elasticity.
21 
  
Given our poverty dataset it is impossible to calculate elasticities for individual 
countries. The elasticities we derive are averages for the developing countries included in 
 
21 The poverty rate (I) is equal to poverty headcount (D) divided by population (P).  Therefore 
i   =   d   -   p         ( 1 )  
where lowercase letters denote per cent change.  The elasticity of poverty incidence with respect to labour 
productivity is given by 
ε  =  i  /  l        (2) 
where l is the per cent change in labour productivity.  If the poverty headcount is to remain unchanged, then 
d=0 and equation (1) become 
i     =     - p         ( 3 )  
We can express the per cent change in labour productivity in terms of the elasticity and the per cent change 
in labour productivity from equation (2): 
i = ε  •   l         ( 4 )  
Substitute (3) into (4) to obtain 
ε  •   l   =   - p         ( 5 )  
and rearrange to obtain 
l* = -p / ε       ( 6 )    57 
our sample. Our formula can only help us predict the impact of labour productivity 
growth on the number of poor in countries in our sample as a whole (or sub sample based 
on inequality levels). Furthermore, our prediction assumes that labour productivity 
growth is not accompanied by a change in the distribution of income that could affect 
poverty that is not already taken into account in the elasticity estimate. We reproduce the 
elasticities derived for developing countries by simple regression in Exhibit 5 to show the 





Labour Productivity Growth Rate (in italics) Required to Leave the Number of 
Poor Unchanged Given Population Growth Rates 
 
 Population  Growth  rates 
Countries Elasticities  1.0  1.5  2.0  2.5 
High Inequality  -0.45 
Developing Countries  -0.74 















Given the numerous results reported here it is not possible to definitively say 
whether productivity is a more important driver of reductions in poverty than GDP per 
capita. In some cases labour productivity has a larger effect, but in most cases this does 
not hold. However, the fit of the relationship seems to be stronger for productivity even 
though the magnitude of the relationship itself is not as strong. The most important point 
is that all of these results, in combination with previous studies, give compelling evidence 
that both productivity and GDP per capita are important in reducing poverty. 




The Relationship between Productivity, Poverty, and Income Distribution Using 
Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
Income inequality is important in mediating the relationship between economic 
growth and productivity growth and changes in poverty. Indeed, the fact that correlation 
coefficients between economic growth and poverty reduction or between productivity 
growth and poverty reduction are not larger is in part explained by the different levels of 
income inequality across countries. In countries with low initial levels of income 
inequality, a given per cent increase in income, even though it affects all quintiles 
proportionately, has a greater impact in reducing absolute poverty than the same per cent 
increase in income in countries with high levels of income inequality. This is simply 
because the absolute size of the income gains are greater in the low inequality country. 
The same reasoning applies for countries that experience a fall in their income inequality 
relative to those who experience an increase.   58 
 
This sub-section of the report examines the relationship between productivity, 
poverty and income distribution. The first step in constructing the database needed to 
undertake multivariate analysis of the relationship between poverty, labour productivity 
and income inequality is to select countries from the Penn World Tables and World 
Income Inequality databases for which Sala-i-Martin (2002) has provided poverty rate 
estimates. We then retain the countries for which GINI coefficient time series are 
available for at least ten years.
22 
  
Initially, we wanted to undertake a cross-section analysis for the years 1970 and 
1998 using levels of each of the three variables. But because of the incomplete GINI 
coefficient time series, we did a cross-section analysis for the earliest year for which the 
GINI coefficient was available (and closest to 1970) and another one for the latest year 
(and closest to 1998). Associating labour productivity levels to GINI coefficients was 
easy because labour productivity estimates are available for each year from 1970 to 1998. 
But this was not the case for poverty rates. We therefore had to assign poverty rates to 
GINI coefficients on the basis of closeness to the years of availability. For example, if the 
earliest year of availability of a GINI coefficient was 1972, we assigned it the 1970 
poverty rate. We then used the Ordinary Least Squares procedure with linear functional 
form to estimate the coefficients. 
 
  We also want to study the relationship between variations over time in each 
variable. We use the earliest and latest year available to calculate average annual growth 
rates for labour productivity and GINI coefficients and percentage changes for the 
poverty rates. Therefore, the growth rates for some countries are for shorter periods than 
for others. We then use the same statistical procedure as used for level comparisons. 
 
We estimate an equation with the poverty rate as the dependent variable and 
labour productivity and inequality (measured by the GINI coefficient) as the explanatory 
variables. We use the one dollar a day poverty measure as well as the two dollars a day 
measure. We would expect a negative coefficient for labour productivity since higher 
aggregate productivity will be associated with higher income. We would expect a 
positive coefficient for income inequality since higher income inequality, every thing else 
being equal, would be associated with a higher poverty rate. 
 
In the regression using the one dollar a day poverty measure for the earliest year, 
the coefficient for labour productivity has the expected sign and is statistically different 
from zero at the 1 per cent level. It predicts that a $1,000 per worker higher level of 
labour productivity would be associated with a 1.5 percentage point lower poverty rate. 
The income inequality coefficient also has the expected sign but it is not statistically 
different from zero (at the 10 per cent level). The regression predicts that a 1 per cent 
increase in the GINI coefficient will be associated with a 0.068 percentage point higher 
                                                            
22 There are only 27 countries left after the selection: 12 in Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, El Salvador, Venezuela), 13 in Asia 
(Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Korea, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan) and 2 in Africa (Ethiopia, Tanzania).   59 
poverty rate. The intercept coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 5 per cent 
level. Based on the R-squared value, 41 per cent of the variation in the poverty rate is 
explained by variations in labour productivity and income inequality. 
 
The regression results also report on the one dollar a day poverty measure with 
the latest year available (and closest to 1998). The labour productivity coefficient has the 
expected sign, and is statistically different from zero at the 5 per cent level. The 
regression predicts that a $1,000 dollars per worker higher labour productivity level will 
be associated with a 0.6 percentage point lower poverty rate. The coefficient for income 
inequality has the expected sign as well but again, is not statistically different from zero 
(at the 10 per cent level). The intercept coefficient is significantly different from zero at 
the 10 per cent level. The independent variables have less explanatory power when data 
for the latest year is used. Only 21 per cent of the variation in the poverty rate is 
explained by variation in labour productivity and inequality compared to 41 per cent 
when data for the earliest years are used. 
 
When the two dollars a day poverty measure and earliest year available are used, 
the coefficient for labour productivity has the expected sign and is statistically different 
from zero at the 1 per cent level. The regression results predict that a $1,000 per worker 
higher labour productivity level will be associated with a 2.6 percentage point lower 
poverty rate. The coefficient for income inequality does not have the expected sign but is 
not statistically different from zero at the 10 per cent level. The intercept coefficient is 
statistically different from zero at the 1 per cent level. The model has good explanatory 
power since variation in labour productivity and income inequality explain almost 62 per 
cent of the variation in the poverty rate. 
 
The labour productivity coefficient still has the expected sign when data for the 
latest year available and the two dollars a day poverty measure are used. It is statistically 
different from zero at the 1 per cent level. A 1.1 percentage point lower poverty rate is 
expected from a $1,000 per worker higher labour productivity level. The income 
inequality coefficient has the expected sign but again is not statistically different from 
zero at the 10 per cent level. A one per cent higher GINI coefficient is expected to be 
associated with 0.5 percentage point lower poverty rate. The intercept coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero at the 10 per cent level. As was the case when using the 
$1 a day poverty measure, the explanatory power of the model is lower if data for the 
latest year available is used. Only 38 per cent of the variation in the poverty rate is 
explained by the variation in labour productivity and income inequality compared to 62 
per cent when the data for the earliest year available are used. 
 
Regressions of the percentage point change in the poverty rate on the average 
annual growth rates of labour productivity and income inequality are also estimated using 
both poverty measures. We expect the coefficient for labour productivity to be negative, 
because growth in aggregate labour productivity would lead to growth in income and 
would reduce poverty if inequality remains constant. We expect a positive coefficient for 
income inequality growth because growth in inequality could lead to growth in poverty 
although not necessarily. If the income of only the top income quintile rises over time, 
inequality would rise, but absolute poverty would not.    60 
 
Using the one dollar a day poverty measure, the regression results have the 
expected sign. The average annual growth rate in labour productivity has a coefficient 
statistically different from zero at the 5 per cent level. The regression predicts that a one 
percentage point higher average annual growth rate in labour productivity would lead to a 
1.75 percentage point reduction in the per cent change in the poverty rate between the 
earliest and latest year of availability. The income inequality coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero at the 10 per cent level. From the regression results, it is 
expected that a one per cent higher income inequality average annual growth rate will be 
associated with a 3.3 percentage point lower percentage point increase in the poverty rate 
between the earliest and latest year of availability. This model does not have much 
explanatory power since only 26 per cent of the variation in the percentage point change 
in the poverty rate is explained by variations in the average annual growth rates in labour 
productivity and income inequality. 
 
Using the two dollars a day poverty measure yields similar results. Both 
coefficients have the expected sign, yet only the average annual growth rate in labour 
productivity coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1 per cent level. From the 
regression results, it is expected that a one per cent higher labour productivity growth rate 
will be associated with 3.5 percentage point reduction of the change in the poverty rate 
between the earliest and latest year of data availability. It is also predicted that a one 
percentage point rise in the GINI coefficient will be associated with a 2.8 percentage 
point larger change in the poverty rate between the earliest and latest year of data 
availability. According to the model, the variation in the two independent variables 
explains 32 per cent of the variation in the percentage point change in the poverty rate. 
 
  The bottom line from the multivariate analysis is that income distribution does 
indeed affect the extent to which productivity gains are passed on to poor workers as 
income gains and reductions in poverty, but the relationship certainly appears weaker 
than the more basic relationship between productivity and poverty. 
 
 
The Relation Between Productivity and Poverty Using Alternative Measures 
of Poverty 
 
  In addition to the use of the conventional poverty measures based on one and two 
dollars per day, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) produces indices 
of poverty based on a much more multi-dimensional conception of poverty. This sub-
section of the paper examines the relationship between these measures and productivity 
and compares the results to those between conventional poverty measures and poverty.  
 
Using labour productivity estimates from both the KILM-GGDC data set and the 
Penn World Tables, we plot labour productivity against the Human Development Index 
(HDI) and the Human Poverty Index (HPI) produced by the UNDP to ascertain if the 
relationship is different from the one observed using income poverty measures. There are 
108 countries for which the UNDP publishes the HDI and we have labour productivity 
estimates from the Penn World Tables. This number falls to 31 when the KILM-GGDC   61 
estimates are used. As for the countries for which the HPI for developing countries (HPI-
1) is available, the Penn World Tables have labour productivity estimates for 83 of them 





From Exhibit 6, it appears that the relationship between the KILM-GGDC labour 
productivity estimates and the HDI is positive as expected. Using a linear functional 
form, we obtain a high R-squared value of 0.636. With the Penn World Tables estimates, 
the value was slightly lower at 0.540 (Chart 5). Comparing the relationship between the 
HPI and labour productivity is of more interest since the HPI is not based on any variable 
that comprises real GDP. The relationship is quite tight between the KILM-GGDC labour 
productivity estimates and the HPI as the R-squared value of 0.524 shows. The R-squared 
value using Penn World Tables estimates is again lower at 0.334 (Chart 6). As labour 
productivity is higher in a country, its HPI score tends to be lower.  
 
There appears to be a somewhat tighter relationship between these broader 
measures of poverty and productivity levels compared to the results obtained using 
conventional measures of poverty (Exhibit 6). For the KILM-GGDC productivity 
estimates, the R-squared coefficients between both the HDI and the HPI levels and the 
productivity levels are both greater than that for the two conventional poverty measures 
and productivity. For the Penn World Tables estimates, the HDI/productivity relationship 
is tighter than the conventional poverty/productivity relationships, but the 





Comparison of R-Squared Coefficients: The Relationship Between Labour 
Productivity and Poverty incidence, Conventional and Alternative Poverty 
Measures, Growth and Levels in Developing Countries 
 
HDI   HPI-1   Sala-i-Martin   Sala-i-Martin   
    $1  a  day       $2  a  day 
Levels 
KILM-GGDC   0.6364   0.5239   0.2275    0.4298 
Penn  World  Tables  0.5397   0.3340   0.3850    0.5600 
 
Growth 
KILM-GGDC   0.4851   NA   0.1295    0.2988 
Penn  World  Tables  0.3223   NA   0.3880    0.5099 
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Trend Analysis 
 
  The results from the regression analysis show that there is a relatively strong 
negative relationship between growth in real GDP per worker and changes in poverty 
incidence. We use the HDI to verify that this relationship still exists when alternative 
measures of poverty are used. It would be more interesting to use the HPI instead since 
that index is not based on GDP per capita but no time series are available yet from the 
UNDP on this variable. Since the HDI measures achievement in capabilities, the 
relationship between labour productivity growth and changes in the HDI should be 
positive. 
 
  To investigate the relationship between labour productivity growth and changes in 
the HDI, we consider all developing countries for which a HDI time series is available for 
the 1975-2000 period. Of these countries, labour productivity estimates from the Penn 
World Tables are available for 68 of them (17 in Asia, 21 in Latin America, and 30 in 
Africa), while estimates from the KILM-GGDC data set are available for 28 of them (14 
in Asia, 7 in Latin America, and 7 in Africa). We present the R-squared coefficients for 
Asia, Latin America, Africa, and developing countries. All coefficients had a positive 
sign indicating a positive relationship between the two variables as we expected. 
 
The R-squared coefficients derived from the use of the HDI differ from the ones 
based on conventional poverty measures. The estimates from the Penn World Tables 
suggest labour productivity growth seems to have significantly less success in explaining 
changes in the HDI as the lower R-squared coefficient shows (see Exhibit 6). The 
coefficients are even lower than the ones obtained from the use of the one dollar a day 
poverty measure. The R-squared coefficients are also different when the KILM-GGDC 
labour productivity estimates are used.  
 
Labour productivity has the strongest explanatory power in Africa when the HDI 
is the measure of poverty. But it is in Africa that labour productivity has the weakest 
explanatory power when conventional measures of poverty are used (see Exhibit 7). But 
in general, the KILM-GGDC estimates of labour productivity have success in explaining 
changes in the HDI, except in Asian countries. A possible reason that could explain these 





R-Squared Coefficients between Labour Productivity Growth and Changes in the 
Human Development Index, based on Penn World Tables and KILM-GGDC data 
 
 Asia   LA   Africa   Developing   
Countries 
Penn World Tables      
Productivity  growth  0.307   0.057   0.145   0.322 
 
KILM-GGDC 
Productivity  growth  0.128   0.430   0.708   0.485   65 
Overall Findings 
 
  The results of this section of the paper suggest that the relationship between 
productivity growth and poverty reduction in developing countries over the last three 
decades appears even stronger than that between economic growth and poverty reduction, 
and about as important as that between GDP per capita growth and poverty reduction. It 
was also found that the level of income inequality mediates the relationship between 
productivity growth and poverty reduction. The greater the level of inequality and any 
increase in inequality, the less an increase in productivity and income will reduce 
poverty.  
 
  The general mechanism that explains why productivity growth reduces poverty is 
that productivity growth is the main determinant of income growth. The relationship 
between labour productivity growth and income growth is at the total economy or 
aggregate level. Gains in aggregate labour productivity mean that there is more real 
income in the economy that can be distributed to factors of production. In an economy 
with competitive product and factor markets, the relationship does not hold, and should 
not hold, at the firm or industry level. Workers in a sector that enjoys above average 
productivity growth will not see their wages increase more than the economy-wide 
average because of inter-sectoral wage competition due to labour mobility between 
sectors. What happens in these above average productivity growth sectors is that firms 
experience a decline in the relative price of their products. All members of society share 
in the productivity gains through lower prices, which raise real wages and incomes. 
 
Aggregate labour productivity growth accrues from two sources. The first is 
intersectoral shifts of workers from low productivity level industries such as agriculture 
to high productivity level sectors such as manufacturing. Growth accounting studies have 
shown that this has historically been a very important source of productivity gains in the 
developed countries and it is currently a significant source of gains in the developing 
world. The workers who make this move enjoy large income gains, allowing many to 
move out of poverty. The second is intra-sectoral productivity growth. Again, because of 
labour and product market competition the wage gains of workers are not related to the 
productivity gains in their sector, but to aggregate labour productivity growth, although 
there may be many exceptions to this rule in non-competitive settings. 
 
Through government fiscal policies, all members of society, not just workers, can 
benefit from productivity growth. Part of the higher factor incomes arising from 
productivity growth can be taxed from the factors of productions and the proceeds used 
for transfers or public services potentially targeted at the poor. 
 
  Since the Industrial Revolution, there have been both winners and losers in the 
economy￿s quest for productivity growth. Technological change, the key driver of both 
economic and productivity growth, both creates and destroy jobs. Economists often note 
that in the long run higher productivity makes everyone better off by raising the material 
base of society. But the path to such an outcome can be difficult for those displaced and 
made redundant by the creative destruction of the growth process. Since the Luddites, the   66 
destruction or ￿restructuring￿ caused by the introduction of new productivity-enhancing 
technologies has provoked resistance on the part of those affected, which can have the 
effect of slowing the pace of technological change.  
 
A growing economy that offers ample reemployment opportunities is crucial to 
minimizing the social costs from creative destruction, particularly over longer periods. 
But it is unlikely that a market economy will solve all social problems associated with 
restructuring. Public policy has an important role to play, particularly in the short-to-
medium term. In principle, one can compensate the losers of the growth process. Their 
suffering can be lessened through income support programs and measures which foster 
their reemployment in other sectors and occupations, such as retraining programs. But in 
poor countries there are significant barriers to the development of such programs, 
including their cost and ineffective governance structures. 
 
  The results in this section provide strong support for the view that productivity 
growth is essential for poverty reduction and should be a priority for developing 
countries. Consequently, the challenge developing countries face is to foster productivity 
growth, but at the same time to develop adjustment mechanisms that can protect those 
negatively affected by such productivity growth. It is important that productivity growth 
be seen by the population as the basis of the material advance of society and not 
associated with permanent job loss and catastrophic falls in income and living conditions. 
This is an issue of political economy. 
 
  Two examples of creative destruction in developing countries illustrate the need 
for a deeper understanding of the economic and political ramifications of productivity 
growth. The first is the restructuring that has affected state enterprises in China. These 
firms have recorded very large productivity gains, often through massive layoffs of 
workers.
23 Often these workers receive little if any compensation and have no access to 
retraining programs. For these workers, productivity can be a dirty word. The second 
example is the restructuring that is affecting the traditional low productivity agricultural 
sector in developing countries. The introduction of productivity-enhancing technologies 
in agriculture, while a necessary condition for development, can cause much suffering for 




                                                          
It is easy to say that productivity is crucial for living standard increases and 
poverty reduction. It is much harder to identify policies that will increase productivity 
growth. In dynamic economies, economic growth is largely accounted for by 
productivity. Policies that foster economic growth will therefore by definition increase or 
maintain productivity growth. The literature has shown that the types of public policies 
that stimulate growth include policies that maintain strong levels of non-inflationary 
aggregate demand through appropriate fiscal and monetary policies, policies that promote 
openness and competition, policies that foster human capital development, policies that 
stimulate investment in machinery and equipment and innovation, and policies that 
 
23 See CSLS (2003b) for a detailed discussion of China￿s productivity performance during the transition 
period.   67 
facilitate the transfer of resources from low productivity sectors to high productivity 
sectors. 
 
  The United Nations has set as a goal for the world community the halving of the 
rate of world poverty between 1990 and 2015. Over this period, the achievement of such 
a goal would require an annual rate GDP per capita growth of 3.6 per cent. This is 
equivalent to a rate of productivity growth of a minimum of 3 per cent as growth as in 
most countries there is limited potential for increases in the employment/total population 
ratio to make large long-term contributions to living standard growth. The poor are 
already in the labour force. Based on a continuation of developments in the 1990s, Asia is 
on track to meet this poverty-reduction objective because of strong productivity growth 
and poverty reduction in China. However, Latin America, and even more so, Africa are 
greatly off track in attaining this goal given their dismal economic performance in the 






Based on recent work undertaken by the Centre for the Study of Living Standards, 
this paper has provided a detailed discussion of the linkages between productivity and 
social development in market economies. The first section reviewed recent literature on 
the impact of productivity on different aspects of social development and on the social 
determinants of productivity. The second section used the CSLS Index of Economic 
Well-being to identify the two-way linkages between productivity and economic and 
social well-being. The third section provided a detailed examination of the empirical 
relationship between productivity and poverty in developing countries.  
 
In the end, our plea is for a social understanding of productivity. Productivity 
does not simply enhance our material standard of living; it also expands the range of 
choices available. Increased productivity gives society the choice through both markets 
and the political arena of whether our greater economic well-being will manifest itself 
through greater private consumption goods, more public goods, additional leisure, or 
greater public transfers to increase equality and economic security. Of course, enhanced 
productivity will not automatically increase the social well-being, but it will reduce the 
apparently zero-sum nature of many of the decisions that we face today, and make it 
easier to achieve the economic and social goals that all citizens of the world have the 
right to expect to achieve. 
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